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PROFESSOR BRIGHTMAN'S THEORY OF A LIMITED GOD. A CRITICISM

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THAT the success of the formulation of religious ideas depends so largely on the achievement of a careful and often delicate balance between contrasting attitudes or ideas, is quite evident from the history of doctrine. And it is no hazard to claim that religion itself, more so than any other realm of mind, maintains itself by virtue of its ability to harmonise and balance significant contrasts. Paradoxes in themselves are only academic devices; the religious spirit must seek to attain cordial relations between the opposite poles. For nowhere else do we find the interplay of the deepest opposites to be so vital. Bernard Bosanquet has defined the life of the spirit to consist essentially in a tension between the finite and the infinite. This tension is the very heart of religion; oversimplification does not aid but stultifies the religious life.

It is in this frame of mind that we must approach Professor Brightman's recent attempts to restate and modify the problem of evil and its effects on our conception of God. The conceived relations between these two opposite realities have, in Professor Brightman's opinion, become forced and inadequate. The nature of evil, imperfection and limitation in general has not been clearly and comprehensively understood, as a consequence of which we think in too artificial terms about its relation to God. So, for example, the claim that all evil and imperfection are due to a voluntary self-limitation on the part of God for the sake of ulterior ends, does not measure up to the facts of our experiences of them; that is to say, the explanation is a strained one, due to a desire to save God from all contamination or fault. Such an explanation eventually reaches a stage of being unproductive for our efforts to deal with the facts of evil. The scales

must be more evenly balanced by a realisation that evil is profoundly real, for God as well as for us. Professor Brightman's attempt to reconstruct the tissue of thought as centered around these two foci is found especially in his recent works "The Problem of God,"¹ and "The Finding of God."²

For the sake of clear understanding and a just estimate of this attempt, it is necessary to appreciate an important consideration which underlies the entire argument, and which gives it a claim to being a noteworthy contribution to the thought on this problem. It is the idea that the power of God is to be conceived not so much as sheer physical force, the ability to bring things to pass by fiat will, but rather as the power to achieve a purpose, to accomplish the realisation of values. That is to say, the complaint against the lack of power on the part of God is not against his inability to overrule circumstances and forcibly bring about the intended results, but against his apparent inability to overcome resistance and tension in the development of the good. The latter type of power may be designated as immanent and emergent, the type exemplified in an organic process rather than in an unmediated creation. Professor Brightman tells us in a short autobiographical sketch³ that the study of evolution more than anything else prompted him to accept the idea of a finite God. Unless we realise this distinction, we shall fail to appreciate the merit of Professor Brightman's attempt to restate the problem and attain a more adequate solution. For few will now consider a lack of power of the former type to be a serious defect in the divine control of the universe; not only would a manifestation of power of this type be at odds with our knowledge of the character of the universe and its processes, but it would rob any attainment of ends thus achieved of real merit.

The contrast between these two types of power just explained is closely related to another set of alternatives with regard to which Professor Brightman takes issue. It is the alternative between what may be generally included under the terms

¹ Abingdon Press, 1930.

² Abingdon Press, 1931.

³ Contemporary American Theology, ed V. Ferm, I 53 ff.

Dualism and Monism. Although I have not found anywhere in Professor Brightman's writings any decisive refutation of metaphysical dualism, and although his theory is not above suspicion on this score, yet the main thrust of his position is to avoid such a dualism. It is indeed evident throughout that he intends to offer the hypothesis of a "Given" aspect in the nature of God as a worthy substitute for it. He definitely rejects such a dualism because it would be mere evasion, and because it produces more difficulties for thought than it solves. In the last analysis such a theory would gain nothing over his own, because any reality independent of God would inevitably "cast its shadow on his inner life."⁴ Professor Brightman, therefore, definitely accepts monism, in the sense that he holds that all the facts of experience, whether good or evil, must ultimately be referred to God. "It is true that we can rightly ascribe moral evil to human freedom and to it alone; yet God created man." And as for the extra-human factors which delay or thwart the realisation of what is ideally best, these also "must ultimately be ascribed to God in all detail — either to his will or to his nature. Tornadoes, earthquakes, tidal waves, volcanoes, idiocy, insanity, hysteria, cancer, infantile paralysis — all these ills somehow come from God."⁵

Relying on the soundness of these presuppositions, Professor Brightman adopts the theory of a factor within the nature of God, which he designates as "The Given" in God, and by which he hopes to explain the fact of evil. In a sense, Professor Brightman wishes us to conceive the whole nature of God as "given," that is, as uncreated, and not the product of his will. But it is evident that the term "The Given" must be considered as a distinctive feature in God's nature, for the notion appears to be adopted for the sake of offering an explanation of the general fact of evil and limitation. The term "mysterious X," which Professor Brightman employed earlier, clearly indicates that it is that factor in God which restricts his will and places limitations upon his constant creative activity. To be sure, we must consider all the determinants of God's nature to be

⁴ The Finding of God, 176.

⁵ The Given and its Critics, Religion and Life, I 1, 1932, 135.

affected by it, but the fact remains that this restriction resides in a definite something, a specific cause of that limitation and evil which is of chief concern.

This idea of The Given in God is plainly an hypothesis. We have no direct knowledge of its character, but can only infer it from our experience of the processes and structure of the world. It remains "mysterious," and at best we can think it only by human analogies. Of these, perhaps the most fitting is the analogy of our sense experience, supplying us with immediate data which become raw material for mind and will to fashion and inform. It is conceivable that God's mental life is similarly confronted with a datum, so much raw material out of which he is to bring order. Professor Brightman further indicates that it may be not unlike the irrational, impulsive feature in man's will. And, perhaps with less directness, he suggests that The Given is analogous to the physical, insofar as that always presents to the mind a degree of resistance and recalcitrance. These general characterisations serve to indicate that we must think of The Given in God as that factor in His nature which is never fully integrated, and which offers some degree of resistance to his creative activity, entering as a distorting feature into that activity. In this sense it is a limitation within his nature, or upon his will as expressing that nature. The further determination of its character can be obtained only by inference from its manifestations in the creative processes in the world of our experience; hence I must leave it to the reader to acquire a further acquaintance with it from the ensuing discussion, insofar as it presents the various ways in which The Given manifests itself and how it appears to be dealt with in God's creative activity.

I propose, in this paper, to limit myself to the consideration of one issue which I hold to be significant in Professor Brightman's argument as well as in similar positions. I am not claiming that what I have to offer will definitely solve the problem, but I hold it to be of such a nature as to qualify the conclusion at which Professor Brightman arrives. The question I wish to raise is whether a limitation of the power of God, as described, necessarily implies a corresponding limitation in the being or nature of God, such as Professor Brightman infers. By a limi-

tation in the nature of God I assume that we both mean some aspect or phase of his existence not fully correlated with, or integrated into, his nature or personality. This definition suffices to indicate that there can be no mere external limitation to God's activity which would not also reflect on his internal nature. In keeping with the two propositions which I sketched at the beginning, my argument will consist of two parts, a positive and a negative. The positive phase will attempt to show that the interpretation of God's power as organic and evolutionary in character rather than physical force itself points the way toward a conception of God which restores his absolute nature, as free from limitation. In the negative part of the argument I shall endeavor to indicate how the inference of a limitation in the nature of God, because of a limitation of his power, has made Professor Brightman's position liable to the charge of dualism which he hoped to escape. I shall take up the latter part of the argument first.

That the power of God is limited because it faces realities which imply a dualism seems most clearly evident from the fact that The Given aspect of God's nature is responsible for an evil which Professor Brightman does not wish to ascribe to the will of God directly. Although evil frequently escapes in his treatment with the lenient designation of representing a drag or tension in the cosmic process, other representations clearly show that it is nothing vague or illusory. The Given from this point of view is sufficiently concrete to mar perfection, to "explain the presence of horrible evils and distortions"; it places obstacles and hindrances in the way of God's creative activity and "causes the world to be other than it would be if God were strictly omnipotent."⁶ Certainly these characterisations warrant the conclusion that The Given "on its darker side" is an effective cause, producing results which are not willed by God, and with which he must contend.

This claim is more specifically borne out by certain statements concerning the manner in which The Given as a source of evil affects the creative activity of God. Illustrative of this is Professor Brightman's explanation of force in a universe domi-

⁶ The Finding of God, 177.

nated by a spiritual purpose. The fact of force as linked with spiritual values, such as love, is essentially incomprehensible, unless we adopt the conclusion that the character of The Given necessitates the use of force to achieve a spiritual purpose. "Force is purpose, but purpose dealing with recalcitrant material."⁷ Can we then avoid the conclusion that the "dark side of The Given" must possess a character of its own, contrasted with God's creative activity, to effect so definite a change in the purpose of God? This is even more clearly illustrated by particular instances of how The Given "enters as a partially distorting and delaying factor into every creative act of God."⁸ At times The Given represents merely a check or delay in the realisation of activities which are not its own, but at other times it is itself responsible for the coming into existence of things which would otherwise not have been born. These things appear to be a sort of mixture of good and evil, such as drugs and alcohol, or again the fact of sex in which "the divine and the infernal are both so near."⁹ Realities such as these are sometimes represented as "mysterious byproducts of God's struggle with The Given, a shower of terrible and blinding sparks from the cosmic forge," and at other times as constituting the type of raw material with which God has to deal in The Given, which he, as well as we, must conquer and put to use in the service of the good. As a matter of fact, this pictorial language hides a puzzling question which confronts the students throughout Professor Brightman's writings on this score. Does The Given itself contain a definitely evil factor, which becomes mixed with the products of God's creative activity? And, if so, how can The Given, at least as far as its evil element is concerned, be said to be in any sense an aspect of God? Or is The Given to be conceived as in itself neutral as to evil or good, but simply contributing characteristics which result in evil? The problem then is how a good God and a neutral "Given" could in collaboration produce definite evil. But in either case it is clear that The Given on its darker side contributes substantially and independently to the works of God's creative activity.

⁷ *Ib.* 153.

⁸ *Ib.* 175.

⁹ *Ib.* 154.

A situation even more puzzling, but substantiating the charge of dualism, arises from the fact that in many respects Professor Brightman tends to identify The Given with the empirical world. This identification seems suggested by the analogy of The Given to human sense experience; it constitutes an "eternal subject matter which eternal divine thought and goodness have to reckon with in all their dealings as human thought has to reckon with sense data."¹⁰ Now the character of this empirical world presents certain features which cannot be said to have originated directly from God. For example, despite his disapproval of ascribing the term "material" to The Given, Professor Brightman nevertheless refers to the physical world as "the realm . . . which hinders the attainment of goodness and beauty, intelligence and love."¹¹ Further, such factors as economic laws, the conditions that make for war, the sensuous in beauty, and time have entered into this empirical world. Again the question arises whether these factors are to be originally included within The Given, or as is frequently presented, they are a product of the control which God exercises over The Given. Professor Brightman seems to emphasize the latter alternative, in which case God's real problem is not so much with the original abstract "Given" but with the products of his own activities upon it. These products then are not to be included in the nature of God as The Given originally conceived is; they are at least one degree removed from God. In which case it is all the more apparent that God has to deal with data external to him, and into which have entered factors essentially alien to his spiritual purposes.

Considerations such as the above tend to confirm our opinion that The Given is in some respects external to God, and offers its independent contribution to his creative activity; that the theory of The Given has not escaped dualism as successfully as it hoped to. But we shall at once be informed that we have failed to recognise the major point in the theory. None of the above mentioned facts necessitates the assumption of a reality independent of God, since the distorting or delaying factors in The Given do not differ essentially from other aspects of God's

¹⁰ *Ib.* 175.

¹¹ *Ib.* 173.

nature, in that neither were created or willed by God. God did not create his own nature, since that idea would imply that "we split him into the he that creates and the himself that is created and at once need another creator to create the creator."¹² The Given therefore represents the total uncreated nature of God, including Reason and the moral law as well as the partially distorting and delaying factor; and to declare that the latter contributes a unique element to the life of God does no more require the positing of an external reality than it would to say that Reason contributes its share. The virtue of the theory is that all these may be included within the being of God.

But it appears to me that Professor Brightman is in danger of laying himself open to the same charge with which he confronts his theoretical opponents, namely of dissociating the active will of God from his nature and its attributes. For to deny that God's nature is the expression or exemplification of his will would be to foster as radical a split between God's creative will and his nature as the one which Professor Brightman contests, and it is one which is equally mischievous for thought. The need for assuming a "creator to create the creator" would then appear the more urgent, especially in view of the fact that, where the contrast is sustained, the nature of God would represent the more passive phase of his being. If the constituent elements of God's nature are independent of his will, they must represent more general conditions in terms of which God's existence becomes possible or from which his nature is derived. Thus when it is said that The Given as including in this wider sense such factors as Time and the moral law was neither created nor willed by God, the conclusion is scarcely avoidable that they created God, his will having, so to speak, no voice in the matter. And this also would only place the problem one step further back and hold it in abeyance, for the question would remain: why should these uncreated essences include a distorting or recalcitrant factor, a negative along with the positive? Having withdrawn the problem from the context of God's will would imply a dualism of the sort which invites a philosophy of fatalism. The point that I am urging is that the only way to escape

¹² *Ib.* 175.

the disaster of "splitting" God's will from his nature is not by restating the division in a different form, but by maintaining their organic unity, their mutual dependence. It is of course objectionable to consider God's nature as a product of his will; but we must retain a real sense of God's creating his own nature, namely that its determinants have no reality apart from their being concretely realised in God. The question which is fundamental here is that of the meaning of true possibility. The idea of God as a metaphysical notion has traditionally stood for the ground of real possibility, so that outside of their concrete realisation in him these essences of his nature are pure abstractions having no existence. In other words they exist only by being the very forms of his will, and the "ratio" of his self-realisation.

It is evident that Professor Brightman is aware of the hazards involved in asserting that the entire nature of God is to be conceived as "Given" in the sense of not being dependent on his creative will. For he is constantly vacillating between the alternatives of declaring the entire nature of God to be uncreated and qualified as "Given," and making a distinction between what may be called the fundamental, rational nature of God and the irrational element, which is "Given" in a more specific sense. The latter alternative appears to be more characteristic of Professor Brightman's earlier work, "The Problem of God." In this work, The Given is represented as distinctively a passive factor in God's nature. He writes: "there is within him (God), in addition to his reason and his active creative will, a passive element which enters into every one of his conscious states . . . and constitutes a problem for him. This element we call The Given."¹³ His later writings, however, give evidence of an attempt to escape a disruption in the nature of God between the active and the passive, with its attendant danger of being committed to fatalism to account for the irrational and distorting factor. Accordingly the qualification of "Given" is attributed to either his entire will or his entire nature. But this position proves equally unsatisfactory, because it is open to the danger of conceiving the whole nature of God as passive, and hence as subordinate to higher principles. The "necessities of The

¹³ The Problem of God, 113.

Given" must therefore be conceived as having "no reality apart from the unity of the divine personality."¹⁴ This precautionary statement, however, does not adequately meet the situation. For the fact remains that within "the necessities of The Given" there is this factor which is somehow the source of evil and which God has to oppose or progressively to eliminate, and it is inconceivable that God should oppose or eliminate a part of his own personality. In the end, then, we must maintain a fundamental difference between such elementary attributes of God's nature as the moral law, reason, time, which exist by being constantly affirmed by God, and that element of The Given which in the last analysis is responsible for distortion and struggle and for which God is in no sense responsible. The latter remains a factor over and above the essential attributes of God's nature, and still eludes clear definition. Surely the two are not citizens with equal rights in the domain of The Given. If the former are unfinished just as the latter, then God's personality still falls far short of being organised, and God's attaining to complete self-realisation would be dependent on conditions not within his power.

This is in brief the case which can be urged against Professor Brightman. By declaring a limitation within the being or nature of God in accordance with an evident limitation of God's Power, he has yielded to the dualism which he had hoped to escape. It seems apparent that the inference of a limitation in God's nature is made from a limitation of his power, because that Power is conceived as having to deal with forces or data which are in a real sense alien and hence independent. It would be of considerable importance to trace further the consequences of such a position on religious life. Professor Brightman thinks it will stimulate man to ideal activity, since it will give him a realisation of being co-laborer with God in the struggle to overcome evil and establish the good. But in my opinion an alternative result is equally possible. Will the religious man have as real a sense of personal responsibility, if after all the struggle between good and evil is centered in God rather than in himself; and if the outcome depends ultimately on God rather than him-

¹⁴ The Finding of God, 187.

self? It appears to me further to remain undetermined what bearing God's struggle with The Given has on the evil committed by man; but I venture to think that since The Given, with its factor of evil, is a part of ultimate reality, all evil activity can be excused on the basis that fundamental conditions were unfavorable and could not be altered at once. I can see no reason why the first alternative should be more likely to succeed than the second.

I wish now in the second part of this study to point out in a more positive way that the Being of God still may, and in fact must, be conceived as comprehensive and unlimited despite an apparent limitation of his Power. Or, in different terms, the conception of God's Power, as traditionally conceived, is not an ultimate approach to the nature of God, but is inadequate. And I wish to show how Professor Brightman's conception of God's activity upon The Given, discounting the dualism which was not intended, itself overrules by implication the limitation of God's Being, despite limitations of his Power.

In a general and abstract way it can, I think, be shown that God's being must extend to every part of, or factor in, The Given. This is a conviction to which Professor Brightman himself holds in principle. Ever since the "Introduction to Philosophy" he has steadfastly maintained that nothing exists which does not derive its existence from God. He challenges modern theologians to realise that God must have been a participant in the World War. And despite the fact that from The Given arise products other than those of God's love, such as blackness, force, and hatred, nevertheless it must throughout be conceived as organically a part of God. If this is so, even the "darkest side of The Given" must share in the nature of God; there must be continuity of God's life extending to every feature of The Given, or we shall have a baffling break in the divine existence. Specifically this means that if the more "irrational" aspect of The Given is to be related to the rest of God's being, that relationship must be specific and constant. On the one hand, The Given, in this sense, must have a definite character, if God is to deal with it intelligently. It must be a reality which is at least

constant in the manner of its infidelity to the good; it must in some sense possess its proper character. The alternative would be absolute negation, which is non-existent; even Satan is dependent on God. In short, The Given possesses its character, or form, only as sharing in the being of God, who is the source and realisation of all form or reason. On the other hand, it must be assumed that God's relation to The Given remains constant. If it did not, God himself would be a fundamentally changing being; his change would be conditioned by something beyond himself, and he would be a creature rather than creator. The Given, then, exists for God only in terms of that relationship which God bears to it, which in every respect and for every feature of The Given must be rational and normative; and again we must assume that every aspect of it is coordinate with the being of God.

The point may be illustrated concretely by a brief reference. Professor Brightman on occasions suggests that God experiments with The Given, since the history of evolution gives evidence of the fact that some experiments have been abandoned. But what are the implications of an experiment? First of all that certain general features of the field of experiment are known, on which the experiment can be based. One cannot experiment "in vacuo." Secondly, an experiment succeeds or fails only by virtue of the fact that specific forces or principles have been operative throughout the whole experiment, and not merely as a result of it. In both instances it is again evident that the object of the experiment must have its proper character which remains constant, and this character or form must, if we are to reject a dualism, have its source in the being of God. To that extent it is evident how inappropriate is the application of the idea of experimentation to God.

It is not necessary, however, to rest the case with merely speculative arguments. I think it can readily be shown that Professor Brightman's assertions about the relation of God to The Given imply that God's being is extended beyond the apparent limits of his Power. Consider first of all the simple declaration that God can control The Given. Does this mean that God can in every instance effectively deal with the irrational, or

as Professor Brightman expresses it, that The Given can be "mastered" by God? If so, it would imply that God is so well acquainted with its character that he can gauge it thoroughly. Otherwise our faith in God's ability to control it may turn out to be empty, since The Given may at some future date reveal energies which God has not anticipated and which, theoretically at least, may prove beyond his power to master. But we are assured that our faith in God's ability to control The Given is not a romantic or blind faith, but a reasonable faith, based on sufficient experience. And we are further told that God is never ignorant; "God will always know every possible contingency and nothing could catch him unprepared."¹⁵ Such being the case, it follows that The Given is not so contradictory to God as the opposite terms "rational" and "irrational" would seem to indicate. If God can thoroughly know The Given, no aspect of it can be alien to him, or disrupt the continuity of his existence as any limitation would. God's knowledge is not discursive, but intuitive, which implies for God that to know is to be and to affirm. This seems, in fact, to be acknowledged by Professor Brightman when he specifically declares that the limitations of The Given exist "in the very warp and woof of his consciousness."¹⁶

The only alternative to this position is that God controls The Given by sheer force. That is, our faith that God can control The Given rests in the fact that God's ability to cope with it is sufficient for any emergency which may arise. If this does not rest on a positive knowledge of The Given, it means simply the ability to overcome or to force it. But this would constitute just what Professor Brightman has denied at the start, namely unlimited power on the part of God, the power to effect his purpose without reference to The Given. Furthermore, we are distinctly informed that this is not God's method of creative activity; "his cure is slow and evolutionary rather than sudden and absolute."¹⁷ In short, the creation of values, or the ideal, is a matter of growth from within. For we are definitely told that the

¹⁵ The Problem of God, 186.

¹⁶ *Ib.* 166.

¹⁷ The Finding of God, 92.

theory of The Given places its emphasis rather on the continuous creativity and the immanence of God, in contrast to the divine absoluteness and dignity.

If God's control over The Given is therefore not to be one of external imposition, but rather of organic development, we must conclude that The Given has inherent possibilities for development which it must in the first instance have derived from God. We take exception, therefore, to the statement of Professor Brightman that "control implies subjection and guidance, but not creation."¹⁸ For if control and guidance are to have any meaning, they imply the anticipation of a future development which will arise out of the thing guided, that is, The Given. The conception of such a development presents any one of three possibilities: either it constitutes the emergence of entirely new qualities or forms in no sense derivative, in which case, discounting magic, we practically ascribe creative power to The Given; or it means the injection of new forms or qualities by God into material which in no sense possessed them previously, which is certainly creation in its most extreme form; or it is the realisation of possibilities or qualities inherent in The Given originally as deriving from God, which is the more acceptable idea of creation. Hence I wish to contrast the above statement by Professor Brightman with one by F. R. Tennant, that "the designer of the cosmos . . . could not be its architect without being its creator."¹⁹

But God's relation to The Given is not limited to control and subjection; it extends further to include the ability to bring meaning and value out of it. Again, I must urge that if such is the case, it implies that The Given originally possessed these values or significant qualities (we might call it a value-character), which again makes it an integral part of God's being. To be sure, there is much in the writings of Professor Brightman which makes it practically impossible to escape the conclusion that God's achieving meaning and reason from The Given is a matter of sheer imposition; and such we should expect to be the case if our discussion about the evident dualism in Professor

¹⁸ *Ib.* 177.

¹⁹ F. R. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology*, II 123.

Brightman's thought has been justifiable. This latter interpretation of God's activity with respect to The Given in his nature would seem the more warranted in view of Professor Brightman's ethical principles. He seems to rest the case of morality in the final analysis on the imperative of the moral law. In fact, his conception of ethics is quite Kantian throughout. In his discussion of conscience, he declares that we must "impose its laws on our choices."²⁰ Professor Brightman's ethics is largely based on the principles of obligation and duty, which contain the unique feature of being imperative and of being legislative. To be sure, he seeks to attenuate the rigor of the Kantian principles, by attempting in turn to root the imperative of duty in personality which "gives content to obligation."²¹ But like the Kantian rational will, this personality is in a sense a priori, assumed as finally existing, and autonomous rather than being itself an ideal in terms of concrete ends and aspirations, since "even ideals have (for it) only instrumental value."²² To that extent our desires are not allowed a significant part in the moral life; there is no indication of the fact that out of our desires must grow the ideal, and that in fact our ideal is such also by virtue of the fact that it is our chief desire, and that it is truly an ideal only because it elicits from us all our spiritual forces and possibilities.

It is in these same terms of obligation and authority that Professor Brightman frequently conceives God. So for example we meet the following statement: "The Supreme Being, then, is God, not by virtue of his being a creator . . . but by virtue of his loyalty to obligation and his realisation of values."²³ God is a being for whom righteousness is supreme, and once more we read that "he is a God of force, not waiting on human preferences."²⁴ Such statements are not merely incidental; they follow quite naturally from a fundamental conviction that the ethic of obligation affords us the best insight into the nature of God. "There is a road that leads imperatively from obligation to God."²⁵ Religion is in a very real sense a part of morality;

²⁰ Religious Values, 54.

²¹ *Ib.* 49.

²⁴ *Ib.* 65.

²² *Ib.* 16.

²⁵ *Ib.* 63.

²³ *Ib.* 60.

"moral obligation is a more immediate experience than is the existence of God" . . . and "the whole realm of religious experience rests on the basis of loyalty to moral obligation, and cannot declare its independence of morality."²⁶ Such being for Professor Brightman a fundamental approach to God, it is quite natural that he should conceive God in terms of authority and force, as establishing meaning and value in The Given from above and conferring them on data which in themselves lack it, since the moral imperative seems to confer value on natural impulse which in itself wholly lacks such merit.

But we should not be entirely justified in applying such an interpretation to Professor Brightman's position; it seems to be primarily a matter of emphasis and balance. There appears to be sufficient evidence to militate against this interpretation. First of all it can be seen at a glance that either the unhampered imposition or the continuous creation of value would refute the limitations on God's power which Professor Brightman has accepted. Furthermore, it would be contradicted by an equally strong conviction that there is in a real sense a growth and creative process of value. And finally he does not, as a matter of fact, altogether deny that The Given possesses some potential character and implicit form out of which God realises the good. In keeping with a strong idealistic predisposition, Professor Brightman holds that all aspects of existence have their proper form, their ideal character. Thus he holds that mind is the primary datum, that the so-called natural sciences deal, if not with the actually experienced, at least with an ideally possible experience, and that physical nature must be conceived in terms of mind only.²⁷ Consequently, although Professor Brightman still holds matter to possess a strange feature which makes it intractable, matter is not in itself evil or devoid of form, and nature is not only a vehicle for the realisation of ideals, but possesses its own unique value-character which may be developed or lifted up to the ideal. "First the natural, then the spiritual; the task of the spiritual is to do the best that can be done in taming and developing the natural."²⁸

²⁶ *Ib.* 57-58.

²⁷ *Philosophy of Ideals*, 55 et passim.

²⁸ *Religious Values*, 73.

We are thoroughly justified, then, in interpreting the character of The Given on the basis of this more inclusive idealistic principle, for which nothing is essentially alien to the nature of God, and does not, by implication, share in his being. We are at once strengthened in this assumption by the statement that everything is capable of being viewed as in relation to God, that God fulfills all life; for "God is the guarantee that there is not only a purpose for the universe as a whole but also a purpose for every part of it, and that 'nothing walks with aimless feet.'"²⁹ And, if more justification is required, it may be found, I think, in one of the most persistent principles of Professor Brightman's thought, namely that of Coherence, or the synoptic method. The presuppositions of this principle seem to me to exclude the possibility of any reality or aspect of reality being at variance with or in any sense placing strictures on the nature of God who represents the sum of all truth. To claim that it does would be analogous to asserting that the function of respiration limits the life of the whole organism, because it is only one aspect of it. Evil is accordingly often represented by Professor Brightman as simply partiality and exclusiveness, a part setting itself up in opposition to the whole. Remove this exclusiveness, and each existing thing contributes its unique part to the whole, so that "experience as a whole is a sign of his presence, . . . enabling us to discern the divine value of all life."³⁰ And the second implication is the counterpart of this, namely that Reason does not place its interpretation on the facts, but merely harmonises them. That is to say, meaning is not something of which the facts themselves are devoid, only arriving at the end of a rational process; reason does not dictate to the facts, but simply relates all partial truths into a whole; it "always works with material that it does not create by mere reasoning."³¹

If now we apply these considerations to God's activity upon The Given, it must follow that he can create good out of it only by virtue of the fact that it already possesses implicit qualities or forms which constitute its dependence on God, or, in other words, the presence of God in it. Unless we assume this, certain

²⁹ The Problem of God, 165.

³⁰ The Finding of God, 110.

³¹ Religious Values, 20.

statements of God's achievements with The Given become quite inexplicable and irrational. This is particularly true of those instances which deal especially with the "dark side of The Given." God's capacity for creating good is sufficient to bring value even out of suffering. Thus, "an experience which in itself is meaningless or evil may be transformed to meaning and good when the right attitude is taken toward it."³² Again, divine patience "takes calmly and bravely the delays of time and the miseries of existence, knowing that through this process the eternal ideals can come to ever more adequate expression."³³ In short, "God can bring redemption out of undeserved suffering."³⁴ Similarly "he can bring eternal life out of death."³⁵ Error and failure are no obstacles to God, but may become means through which he can cause his light to shine. "God is working good in him (man) through . . . his false beliefs."³⁶ These few instances will suffice to illustrate the general principle that God accomplishes good out of evil; it is the "mystery of his holy power" that "somehow his holy will can turn evils to holy uses"; that in short there is no evil which he cannot redeem.

If we are to take these utterances quite literally, and I can hardly see how we can avoid doing so in certain instances, the issue here is with the idea of real potentiality. That is to say, if we are not to interpret these statements as implying that God uses these evils as mere occasions for realising good, then, as certain instances seem clearly to imply, there is that in the nature of what we call evil that can be utilised for the good. This view implies that evil is primarily a good which has become distorted or unbalanced, or in other words that evil derives its substance from the good, is essentially parasitic, as Professor Brightman himself suggests. This idea is seconded by other statements to the effect that God merely recreates The Given, or reshapes it, and again by the fact that in no case is there anything for God to annihilate or exterminate. God "heals" evil, or uses it in the service of ideals.

We must conclude, then, that The Given presents throughout

³² The Finding of God, 141.

³³ Ib. 147.

³⁴ Ib.

³⁵ Ib. 146.

³⁶ Religious Values, 76.

real potentiality, inasmuch as there is no part of it which God is not able to master and redeem. With respect to the character of potentiality, the writings of A. N. Whitehead have reminded us rather forcibly that potentiality must fully meet the demands of the "ontological principle," namely that, for anything to exist, it must exist definitely and somewhere. Specifically, if potentiality is to be real and relevant, it must exist concretely either in the character of things directly or in the organic relations which are essential to their existence. Real potentiality may be ascribed to a confirmed drunkard for becoming a good citizen, because there is still in his makeup a sensitiveness to good influences, or perhaps a store of memories. But a dog has no potentiality for becoming a good citizen, despite the fact that he can be taught to distinguish between friend and foe, since he is lacking perhaps in neural synapses to use ideas of generalities. The same considerations apply to God's ability to bring good out of every aspect of The Given. Either this is based on real potentiality, in which case God may be conceived as developing what is already present; or God simply uses The Given as an occasion for foisting his values, in which case The Given plays only a very incidental role, and I see no reason whatever for assuming God's power to be limited by it.

As has already been intimated, it is the former position which is the most probable in Professor Brightman's thought. Repeatedly he tells us that religion, or, if you will, God, does not supplant more natural values, and supply wholly unique values in their stead; "the values and laws of religion do not abolish or supersede other values and laws, but they add a new potency to natural life and give it a new direction."³⁷ We are dealing then with real potentiality; The Given "consists also . . . of eternal possibilities which must be actualised with creative pain and effort."³⁸ Accordingly we find that The Given also contributes positive ideal features to the products of God's creative activity. The sensuous element in beauty, despite the hazard which it affords, enhances it to such an extent that without it beauty would be much the poorer. Economic law, though restricting

³⁷ *Ib.* 73.

³⁸ *The Finding of God*, 187.

personal liberty, makes possible a more solid social unity. So throughout, God's increasing purpose with reference to The Given constitutes a real advance toward the goal of complete beauty and joy. By means of The Given God achieves higher levels, and "every achievement of divine control of The Given is a promise of still more creative achievement further on."³⁹

What this discussion has aimed to make explicit is that The Given, insofar as it exhibits real potentiality for ideal development, must be conceived as organically related to the divine nature and not in any sense alien to it so as to distort and inhibit God's creative activity. For this potentiality must be rooted in God, who is by definition the source of all value, potential as well as actual. In short, as presenting real potentiality, we cannot understand The Given except as derivative from God. The term "creation," insofar as it means production by fiat will, may be inadequate to denote this original derivation as indicated by potentiality. But the term creation represents a theory to explain the fact that all conditions of existence and all its possibilities have their ultimate source in God and are sustained by him, just as in a more limited sense the possibilities of growth for a plant are limited by the ingredients of the soil. The well known proverb that a fountain cannot rise higher than its source seems appropriate here. For unless we commit ourselves again to the belief that God uses force in the creation of values, we must accept the principle that even he does not derive meaning and value from any situation beyond the actual possibilities in that situation which constitute its original endowment of potentiality. This implies that the principles by which God brings meaning and value out of a given situation are significant and effective, because the data to which they apply possess implicit virtues or capacities which just those principles will elicit and fulfill; which means that those data are originally and in a real sense conditioned and determined by those principles. Love will fulfill only what is conditioned by or founded on love. The "mystery of God's love" seems to me to consist rather in this original impartation of possibilities for value to a world by which it shares originally in the divine life, than in the creation

³⁹ Ib. 188.

of values where none existed before. However The Given may be further conceived, as possessing throughout possibilities for ideal development it must be derived from and continuous with the divine nature. It does not explain the fact of limitation and struggle, for there is no reason why impulse in God's will, or sense perception in his experience, should make for evil. Neither does it exhibit any limitation upon God's creative activity, any more than we would conclude a limitation in a soil because it produces shrubs and vines as well as oak trees, or because it does not produce oaks immediately.

I should like, finally, to illustrate my point from an important instance in the argument. One of the factors which Professor Brightman cites as constituting a limitation on God's nature derives from the fact that "God is limited by the free choices of other persons"⁴⁰ by virtue of which we are a problem for him. Now it seems to me to be a very defensible thesis that the choices of finite wills may in a real sense be free without necessarily being wholly independent of God or limiting his nature. Let it be considered that the human will not only should not be arbitrary, but cannot be wholly arbitrary. No will can be completely abstracted from the nature in which it is rooted and which it expresses in various degrees of completeness; there is no separate function of the soul designated the will. The nature in which that will is rooted constitutes on the one hand a definite character which shapes each act of will; on the other hand it represents a constant source of possibilities for the will to actualise. This nature in which the will is rooted is an organic part of the world; that is, it is the embodiment of a selected group of possibilities from an extensive realm of possibilities exemplified in its world. If it is not that, its will is pure caprice. Being a creature, whatever else it may mean, signifies not that a new nature is posited by fiat will, but that the conditions or forms of existence in terms of which it may develop its character were not originated by it. These possibilities it finds exemplified in its world, as representing the original impartation of God's nature to that world. The choices of finite wills must therefore always fall within the nature of God; they represent not a re-

⁴⁰ The Problem of God, 124.

striction on God's nature but a continually renewed expression or realisation of that nature, however partial. This conception seems to me to offer the only basis for concluding, as Professor Brightman does, that because "God . . . is the creator of all other persons and gives them the power of free choice, therefore his purpose controls the outcome of the universe."⁴¹

In conclusion let me venture to suggest two conceptions underlying Professor Brightman's thought which prompt him to accept a limitation in God's being by reason of a restriction on his power. The first is a persistent tendency to separate value radically from fact; a tendency which he often attempts to avoid but never succeeds in wholly escaping. The very first chapter of "The Finding of God" gives testimony of this separation, when we are told that "Science gives us the facts of experience, and religion appraises their ultimate value. . . . Science gives us instruments and means, while religion gives us ends and ideals."⁴² The tendency to separate the two is evident already in his first work, the "Introduction to Philosophy," as illustrated for example by his classifying of values with universals. It is evident further in such distinctions as that between content and form, the former representing The Given, and being more or less equivalent to the passive phase of God's consciousness, the latter in contrast constituting the active phase. Again it appears in statements such as that "the cosmic purpose . . . must deal with brute facts which it has no choice but to accept and use."⁴³ But it is not my intention to illustrate in detail how this principle manifests itself in Professor Brightman's thought; I leave it for the reader to recognise as a persistent undercurrent in his writings. I suggest, however, that its effect is to make the attribute of power a very vital one in the conception of God, and its restrictions a serious "contraction" of the nature of God. For if values are not already rooted in the facts, implicit in them, so that the facts themselves may discipline our interests, then it requires virtually a creative act of God to communicate value or

⁴¹ Ib. 113.

⁴² The Finding of God, 23.

⁴³ The Problem of God, 186.

form to the data in question. For there would in the first instance be no particular relevance or appropriateness in the values ascribed, for the data to which they are ascribed, so that certain values would be more adequate than others to do justice to the facts. God has, then, to create even that, as well as definitely to establish those values. Power on this basis holds a primary place in Professor Brightman's thought, and a limitation of it would indicate a serious shrinkage in God's nature.

The second general tendency in Professor Brightman's thought which somewhat predetermines his conclusions is, in my opinion, the conception that God is wholly bound up in the temporal process. Stated in slightly different terms, it is the emphasis on the fact that God is developing through the process, rather than that he is just as truly the source of that process, and that he lends it the character or purpose which makes it significant. It is illustrated in Professor Brightman's insistence that Time belongs to the very nature of God, as being "a real and essential aspect of God."⁴⁴ To be sure, Professor Brightman is justified in arguing against an abstract and "static" God; but it is one thing to assert that time is real for God, and quite another to hold that he is himself subject to time, so as to be himself unfinished and limited by time. And this is in fact the direction in which Professor Brightman's thought tends to lead him. He does not deny God's eternity, but prefers to interpret this to mean "endless duration," without reserving any sense in which God transcends time, and the temporal process depends on God. As a result, God is declared to be "eternally becoming," as developing, and as growing in perfection and personality. Because his work is unfinished it follows that he himself is unfinished. Once more, it is not my intention to elaborate this aspect of Professor Brightman's thought, but merely to point it out as somewhat prejudicing the issue. It is not a consistent principle in Professor Brightman, but rather a matter of emphasis. But the consequence is to make a reality comparable to an environment a requisite for God. It is essential to a process that it should have so to speak a matrix in which it can progressively realise itself. And if God is

⁴⁴ The Finding of God, 131.

to "grow" in any real sense, there must be some larger sphere from which to draw the spiritual resources of his developing personality. God's "infinite perfectibility" implies that The Given will furnish for God real possibilities for his fulfillment. But this is to make God also dependent on the issue of The Given, and what its development will afford. Once this has been acknowledged, the liability seems to me to be too great; for what certainty is left that The Given will not at some future time develop a new emergent aspect which will either fundamentally alter the nature of God or confront him with situations for which his principles will prove inadequate?

THE ETHIOPIC TEXT OF ACTS OF THE APOSTLES

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DR. ROPES in his encyclopaedic treatment of "The Text of Acts," in *The Beginnings of Christianity*, vol. iii, 1926, omitted treatment of the Ethiopic versions for lack of reliable critical material. In the section calling attention to the Ethiopic texts (pp. cxlvi seq.), along with the expression of opinion that an investigation of that field for Acts "would produce interesting and valuable results," he notes the Ethiopic manuscripts recorded for Acts in Gregory's list, of which "one (Paris, Bibl. Nat., aeth. 26 [Zotenberg 42]) is of the fifteenth century." Subsequently to the completion of his volume Dr. Ropes was able to secure a photographic copy of that ms. of Acts; and he did the present writer the honor of asking him to make a critical study of what appeared to be the oldest known witness to Acts in that version.

I pursued the work, alas too intermittently, but finally in December 1932 I sent Dr. Ropes a fairly clean draft of what I had done, asking for his criticism. No answer came from him. Then appeared the notice of his death on January 7. Thus came to an end a happy relationship of many years, in which I am proud to feel that we had formed a mutual friendship. I had undertaken the duty with the primary object of his approval, which would have been full reward. Now it is published, to my own affection, *in memoriam* of a noble gentleman and scholar.

An item in my last correspondence with Dr. Ropes was in regard to missing folios of the ms. in the reproduction, this beginning with folio 36, at Acts ii. 38. I had supposed that the ms. was defective for the opening pages. But Zotenberg's description indicated that the beginning of Acts was contained in folios 31-35. With no advice from Dr. Ropes I was in a quandary. But I took advantage of the presence in Europe of my

friend Professor W. H. P. Hatch, of the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, himself bound on quest of manuscripts, and he was kind enough to pursue my inquiry. He discovered that those responsible for the reproduction had confused two mss., photographing 35 folios of an entirely dissimilar ms. (the Amharic "Laws of the Levites"), then proceeding with folio 36 of the desired ms. Dr. Hatch most promptly procured for me the missing folios, thus completing my treasure. For this service my warmest obligations are due to him.¹ I have also to thank Dr. Hatch for reading my manuscript and for his valuable corrections and textual suggestions.

As the chief result of my study I may premise that Dr. Ropes' sagacious anticipations concerning this manuscript have happily proved fortunate. It offers a primitive text, one untouched by those later revisions which have contaminated most Ethiopic Biblical texts.²

The only commonly accessible material for this Ethiopic book is contained in the following printed texts: that of the London Polyglot (L); the British Bible Society edition of the Ethiopic New Testament, edited by Platt, with reprints in editions published at Basel and Leipzig (B). These prints have their own value and interest in the history of the text, and will be considered severally at the end of this study. Also L and B, although representing late revisions, nevertheless are based upon the primitive text exhibited by our manuscript, and so with due caution are of use in controlling its errors. Indeed, as Hackspill

¹ Another query, unanswered, was as to the ownership of the photographic copy. It has been returned to Dr. Ropes' estate, and I suppose that inquiry at the Harvard Divinity School will discover where it may be found.

² In fact it appears to be the only one of known promise. Gregory in his *Textkritik des Neuen Testamentes*, 2, 559-565, catalogues 101 mss. (our ms. is his no. 70), of which only 12 contain Acts; these are mostly of the 17th and 18th centuries, except no. 69, ascribed by Gregory to the 16th century, but according to Zotenberg (*Catalogue des manuscrits éthiopiens de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, 1877, under his no. 41) its text has been accommodated to that of the London Polyglot. Count Carlo Rossini in his article 'Manoscritti ed opere abissine in Europa,' in *Rendiconti della Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Classe di scienze morale, etc.*, vol. 8, 1899, 606-637, adds no items of manuscripts containing Acts, in fact records none such. It is Zotenberg's judgment that our ms. is of the 15th century — overlooked by Gregory in his statement.

has argued, the story of Bible translation in Abyssinia is not one of new translations but rather of progressive revisions, so that there remains in all forms a basic amount of primitive text.³

There may be added here for completeness' sake a reference to the edition of the Ethiopic Bible recently published by the Catholic Mission in Abyssinia at Asmara, under the editorship of the Franciscan Father F. da Bassano. The New Testament was published in 1920 in one volume, the Old in four volumes in 1923-26 (a copy of the latter is in the St. Clement's Library in the Philadelphia Divinity School). In *Le Monde Orientale*, 23 (1929), 174-180, 'Die äth. Übersetzung der katholischen Mission,' Löfgren has reviewed the Old Testament text, with the result that it is "of small importance for the study of the Eth. O. T." On p. 180 he briefly notes the New Testament edition, which appears to run with Platt's text, "corrected and revised."

I. THE PARIS MANUSCRIPT (P)

Acts is found in folios 31-102 of the bound book constituting the manuscript. The text is sadly defective and the folios most carelessly bound together. This sad condition is aggravated by the fact that it was evidently copied from an earlier manuscript in which in part a similar condition existed; for the breaks in text-consecution occur not only as between folios, but also within the folio page. The following table exhibits this condition of disorder.

FOLIO ORDER	CONTENTS	PROPER ORDER
31r-38v	Title; i. 1-iv. 4	1
39r-50v in col. 1	xiii. 24-xvii. 28, with lacuna of xvi. 17-28	6
50v-52v	viii. 12-ix. 5	3
53r-64v col. 1	iv. 19-viii. 12	2
64v-67v	xi. 27-xiii. 11	5
68r-74v col. 1	ix. 19-xi. 26	4
74v-83v	xvii. 29-xxi. 5	7
84r-91v	xxiv. 10-xxvii. 33	9
92r-99v	xxi. 6-xxiv. 10	8
100r-102v	xxvii. 33-xxviii; subscription	10

³ L. Hackspill, 'Die äthiopische Evangelienübersetzung,' *Zts. f. Ass.* 11 (1896), 187 ff.

Accordingly the ms. contains the following sections: i.-iv. 4; iv. 19-ix. 5; ix. 19-xiii. 11; xiii. 24-xvi. 16; xvi. 29-xxviii.

The ms. is described by Zotenberg in his Catalogue, under no. 42, pp. 39b-41b. He makes the following brief observation upon its character: "Il présente un grand nombre de variantes, d'erreurs et de petites lacunes, tantôt d'un mô't, tantôt d'une phrase." Three samples of the text of Acts are presented: xix. 13-14, 19-26; xxiv. 24-27. The book is divided into 72 chapters (listed by Zotenberg) and into pericopes, the lection assignments appearing at the top of the folios.

The colophon, in part illegible reads: "Here is finished by the might of the Lord the Mission of the Apostles and the Book of their Acts, which commissioned (ʿaṣḥafū) the pilgrims of the Church of the Apostles of Mount Ḳuesḳuam. May they write their name in . . . on a pillar of gold, forever and ever. Amen and Amen. And we who have written are poor and wretched, who are not worthy of the prints of the feet of the pilgrims. We are their slaves, Takla-Şeyōn and Gālawdeyōs (Claudius), monks (dakīka) of Abbā Sāmūʿel of Gadāma-Wālī. It is deposited in your . . . (read ḳa[nō]nā, 'canons'?). And peace to your journey, forever and ever. Amen." ⁴

The title reads: "Acts of the Apostles, that is the history of the holy Apostles; may their prayers come (? L 'advantage') for all us Christians. Amen. Saint Luke the Physician (ṭabīb) wrote when Theophilos asked him, saying."

The ms. is written in an irregular, inelegant hand, but fair enough for reading purposes. It exhibits none of the peculiarities of script, as also of orthoepy and grammar, which are observed in the earliest manuscripts.⁵ The scribe was most careless as copyist, committing all kinds of stupid omissions and duplications; he appears to have had little understanding of what he was copying, as is evident from his constant failure to

⁴ This convent of Abba Samuel of Gadama-Wali is mentioned in Zot., no. 107, p. 204, and probably is the one whose destruction is recorded in no. 141, p. 213a. Takla-Seyon, monk of the same convent, appears also in Zot., no. 136, p. 204 (where for 'Wali' Zot. reads, evidently erroneously, 'Waldeba').

⁵ See Wright, Cat. Eth. Mss. in Brit. Mus., p. x; Hackspill, pp. 127 ff.

distinguish among the several sets of very similar letters in the Ethiopic alphabet. He is most careless in the wild exchange of verbal and nominal inflections. He appears unskilled in his native lexicography and grammar. With the loss of the ancient distinctions among gutturals and emphatics, the Abyssinian scribes became in general careless of orthoepy; but our scribe goes far beyond the limit and perpetrates variations that produce by all syntax and lexicography entirely different sense from his copy. Were it not for the correct forms surviving in the graphically later texts of L and B, it were often difficult to make sense, not to say translation, of many passages. However, many of these errors appear also in L, so that our scribe is in part perpetuating a tradition of slovenly copying; but as a rule L is far cleaner. It is unfortunate indeed that the book of Acts is represented by so uncouth a form of the primitive text.

The following examples of typical errors may be noted. Repetition of words: v. 3 'akō (not); xiii. 1 'Barnabas' repeated before 'Saul.' In cases there appears to be self-correction: xxi. 27, where 'aḥzāb is forthwith corrected with 'aḥazewō (they held him); xxii. 17 balēlīt (at night) along with babēt (in the temple). Confusion of similar letters or sounds: v. 5 tanaseḥa (purge self) for tanaḥeḥa (fall); ix. 2 ba'ala for sa'ala (ask); x. 17 yeṣēli for yeḥēli (be at a loss); x. 47 yebel for yekel (can); xiv. 19 rt. ngr (speak) for wgr (stone); xx. 24 wabr (?) for gabr (so LB = *δρομων*); xxvi. 25 ba'da for 'abad (am mad); baḥra (sea) for ḥamara (ship). The stupidest error for a good churchman is the transformation of the verb in the usual Eth. equivalent for the communion rite, 'he broke the bread,' xx. 11, as 'he blessed the table,' into 'he found the table,' writing rakaba for bāraka. Careless handling of inflectional elements and pronominal suffixes: ix. 26 baṣihōmū for baṣihō, pl. for sing.; xxvi. 21 'aḥazkū (I took) for 'aḥazūnī (they took me); x. 23 'some of his brethren from Joppa went with him' becomes 'some of his brethren, he went with them.' Exchange of similar pronouns appears: ii. 15 'antemmū (you) for 'emüntū (they). The negative prefix 'ī is often omitted before the impf. in y-, a case in vi. 2; also is wrongly inserted, e.g. xv. 18. Further pervers-

sions of text and so of sense appear in the following examples: iii. 16 hayanta (a preposition) for haymānōtā (faith); x. 3 ma'alt (day) for sa'at (hour); x. 27 yetgabarū for yetnagarū; xiii. 31 bezūḥa ḥezba for baḥaba ḥezb with LB (προς τ. λαον); xv. 21 yebē (speaks) for bō (there is); xv. 21 lōmū (to them) for lōtū (to him), with the result, 'Moses says of old who will proclaim to them'; xxiv. 25 'akō (not) for kōna (was); xxvi. 18 basamay (in heaven) for basemeya (in my name). Greek names are generally well transliterated in Ethiopic, but strange perversions appear here: xxviii. 7 Publios becomes Kepwēlōs; xx. 4 Sopatros, Petros. One example may suffice in the geographical field: xxvii. 5 Wārāzūkyā for Murra of Lycia, which appears again in L as Lestia of Asia. Mental lapses are: 'Peter' for 'Paul' xviii. 9; 'Festus' for 'Felix' xxv. 14 (also LB); at v. 36 'Judas,' taken from vs. 37, for 'Theudas'; xxviii. 1 'Julius' becomes 'Justus.'

The text of P is full of omissions perpetrated by our scribe or his immediate predecessors, as the cases now to be cited will show, since they are not found in the sister-text of L. Some of these are simple haplographs; the most striking — for it should have been the most interesting passage in the book to an Abyssinian Christian — is the omission in viii. 27 of *εννουχος δυναστης κανδακης βασιλισσης αιθιοπων*; also omission, i. 4, of *ην ηκουσατε φησιν δια του στοματος μου, φησιν* being picked up again to introduce vs. 5; omission of *τω παυλω κ. τω βαρναβα προς εαυτους εταξαν αναβαινειν*, xv. 21; and of a long passage in xvii. 14, 15 by homoiotel. The following are typical cases of loss of words and phrases also not signalized in L: ii. 41 '3000' becomes '30,' where LB read '300,' P's figure being obtained by loss of *me'et* 'hundred'; iii. 12 — *η ευσεβεια*; v. 42 — *και κατ οικον*; vii. 8 — *διαθηκην*; vii. 42 — *τη στρατεια*; xi. 12 — *το πνευμα μοι συνελθειν*; xi. 21 — *ην μετ αυτων*; xii. 4 — *τετραδιοις* (LB make the figure properly '16'); xiii. 7 — *ψευδοπροφητην*; xxvi. 30 — *η τε βερνικη*; xxviii. 30 — *εν ιδιω μισθωματι*. The omission of xvi. 17–28 is due to some accident of transmission of manuscripts.

The pluses that may be attributed to our scribe or his tradition are few. The following are evidently glosses or doublets, they do not appear in L: iii. 4 for *ειπεν* 'answered and said';

vii. 25 *συνηκαν* represented by two verbs; xiii. 50 'city and land' for *πολεως*; xvi. 15 *μενετε* + 'servants ('agberta) of God,' doublet of 'agbaratanā (*παρεβιασατο ημας*). At v. 29 *ανθρωποις* is rendered with 'eguāla 'emmaḥeyāw (the primitive phrase, 'offspring of the mother of life') followed in duplicate by *sab'*, the later common word for 'man'; on the other hand at xvii. 25 the duplication appears in L alone, PB having only *sab'*. A doublet translation appears in Agrippa's response to Paul, xxvi. 28: 'Will you persuade me, bring me among the Christians, and almost as if you had brought me (plus an unintelligible 'abīya 'great') among the Christians.' The latter doublet is found in B (but minus 'abīya); L goes its own way and reads, 'In a little thou makest it appear and wishest that I become a Christian.' This case instances the varieties that may be found in these texts.

There are numerous cases of artless additions, generally Scriptural reminiscences; e.g. viii. 3 + 'young and children'; x. 39 '[the wood] of the cross'; vii. 2 'the God of our fathers' is prefixed to 'the God of glory' (in Sah. 'of our fathers' is attached to the latter phrase; but Dr. Hatch reports that Sah. MS. *a* agrees with P). Scriptural citations are often amplified. Thus vii. 24 plus 'buried him in the sand' (Ex. ii. 12); vii. 42 '[40 years] in the wilderness' (Am. v. 25); of these additions the former appears in the Western text only, the latter is common in the Antiochian, but such pluses were spontaneously introduced. In i. 20 the pronoun in 'his dwelling,' etc., is changed to the plural in agreement with Ps. lxxix. 25; and in ii. 28 the third line of Ps. xvi. 11 is added, ignored elsewhere. I may note a perversity common to Ethiopic scribes, that of transposition, e.g. v. 14 'women and men.'

I have confined myself in the above observations to the peculiarities of P, to the scribal faults perpetrated by its scribe or his immediate predecessors, and some peculiar characteristics. Putting aside what is peculiar to this one manuscript, we may now broaden the discussion to an appreciation of the general character of the Ethiopic version and revisions of Acts, including the common tradition exhibited by L and also often by B. In L similarly there are innumerable errors — of scribes

and also of printers, for the Polyglot text is itself only a copy of Tasfa-Seyon's Roman print, and no control of either has yet been made. Equally in L occur omissions of words and phrases and also additions, and the revision which has subsequently contaminated this text for the Roman printer has by no means removed these peculiarities. I note by way of example the following cases of agreement between P and L, which will argue for their common textual basis.

iii. 1 PLB om. *ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό* (rendered elsewhere however, e.g. i. 14 *heya* 'there'); v. 38 *διαλυθησεται* represented by two verbs; vi. 2 omission of the negative 'i- with the verb *yeḏḏamadā*, resulting in 'they were ministered to' for *παρεθεωρουντο* (but B correctly); vi. 2 plus '[grace] of God'; x. 42 om. *ὁ ορισμενος ὑπο τ. θεου*; x. 11 PB om. *σκευος τι* (L 'a potter's vessel'), at vs. 16 represented by 'all of it'; xvii. 18 simplification of 'Epicureans and Stoics' to 'learned men' (so also B plus a literal rendering of the Gr.); xvii. 24 om. *οὗτος ουρανου κ. γης υπαρχων κυριος*; xix. 15 om. *τῇ δὲ εχομενῃ ἤλθομεν εἰς μείλητον*; xix. 16 om. *γυμνους κ. τετραυτισμενους*; xx. 15 *αντικρυς χιου* P 'Antikaskiyū, with similar forms in LB, i.e. as proper name; xxiii. 7-8 om. by homoiotel. between *σαδδουκαιων* and *σαδδουκαιοι*. A duplicate common to P and L occurs at xxiv. 6, 'and he thought that Paul would give him money, and he expected that he might have money to bribe him with.' At xiii. 26 PL om. *οἱ ἐν ὑμῖν φοβουμενοι τον θεον*; and at xv. 20 *καὶ τῆς πορνείας*.

The above study exhibits in exemplary way the condition of the text of P by itself, and also its relation to the congeners L and B. These are all shown to have a common basis. I pass on to the consideration of the character of the translation from the Greek, drawing the cases from P and giving the parallelisms with the printed texts when they occur.

ii. 24 *δυνατον* read as *θανατον*, then *υπ αυτου* ignored (so L); ii. 32 *κατενυγησαν* PLB as from rt. *κατανοιγειν*; iii. 20 *προκεχειρισμενον* understood as *κεχρισμενον* (also L; cf. Gr. variants *προκεκηρυγμενον*, *προκεχαρισμενον*); iii. 21 *δεξασθαι* as though *προσδεξασθαι*, 'expect' (also LB); v. 13 *κολλασθαι* as 'injure' (*saḥaṭa*), as though *κολαζειν*? (also LB); vi. 1 *εγενετο γογγυσμος*, 'were collected,' i.e. *γογγ.* understood as *συγγενησις*?; vii. 43

επεκεινα βαβυλωνος = westa Babalōn zekū, 'in that B.,' as though επ εκεινα (cf. a Western reading, in illas partes); vii. 44 ἦν as though the relative ἦν; vii. 57 οἱ μαρτυρες, to avoid the Christian sense of 'the martyrs,' translated 'those who killed him'; viii. 27 ἐπι πασης της γαζης αυτης, 'all the land of Gaza' (L 'ruler of the city of Gaza'); ix. 34 ιαται, 'has pardoned,' as from εαειν; xii. 15 μαινη translated in duplicate, 'art thou mad?,' 'thou shalt remain,' i.e. as from μενειν (so L, where the Lat. tr. is wrong); xii. 15 η δε δισχυριζετο ουτως, 'he knocked moderately' (so L); xiv. 13 του ουτος προ της πολews, 'and the mighty ones of the city' (so L; with misunderstanding of the preposition?); xvii. 23 αγνωστω θεω, 'purge yourselves to God,' as from vb. αγνευειν (L doublet, 'to the unknown God purge yourselves'); xvii. 25 θεραπευεται in sense of 'heal' (so L); xvii. 31 εν ανδρι as though εν ανδρεια (wabaḥailū); xviii. 15 ονοματων και νομου, 'names of men,' as though ονοματα ανθρωπων; xviii. 22 ασπασαμενος as though πεισαμενος (ta'amenōmū; also B); xviii. 28 εντονως as εντονως (baḥekkū) or ικανως (s. Dillmann, Lex. 97; also L); xix. 9 τυραννου, 'rulers'; xix. 39 εννομω εκκλησια επιλυθησεται, as though εν νομω εκκλησιαν επιλυσομεν; xx. 1 μεταπεμψαμενος as πεμψας; xxi. 30 καταγαγων τον παυλον εστησεν εις αυτους, 'and P. also came and stood in the midst of them'; xxi. 31 φασις translated by a word = 'chiliarch' (also LB); xxii. 22 ηκουον as 'I heard' (also L); xxiv. 10 επισταμενος as acc., plus 'their law' (also L; B retains with amplification from Gr.); xxvi. 4 γενομενην as εγενομην (leḥekkū 'I grew up,' so LB), plus 'and [know me].'

These cases show that L and B are based on the ancient text and often carry its errors, at times with revision. They are revisions, not fresh translations, as the phenomena of Ethiopic translation have often been thought to be. It may again be repeated that the translator worked for his own hand, without reference to other versions which might have helped him out. And the stupidities we find in the present witnesses to his text go back to his original work, are not necessarily the result of later corruptions of the text.

Allowing the translator's very faulty knowledge of Greek we may now consider the general nature of his translation. Certain

characteristics of the Ethiopic versions of the Scriptures have been constantly recorded by scholars. On the one hand there often appears a great fidelity to the original; but this is particularly to be remarked for the Old Testament where the simplicity of style and the parallelism of Semitic idiom gave facility to the Abyssinian scholar. Often, as in Kings, the Ethiopic is most faithful to the Greek, running as close to it as the Old Latin, and sharing with the latter the honor of being the closest to the Vaticanus.⁶ At the same time the Ethiopic translators allowed themselves much freedom, instanced in transpositions of phrases, abbreviations for simplicity, occasional additions. In a word their versions are primarily targums, in which the translator did not feel himself bound to offer a literal translation, but rather the sense of the original, ignoring or ironing out the difficulties of the original for the sake of his native readers and hearers. There was no compulsion to give a literal translation, for, contrary to more modern views of the Scriptures, their inspiration and authority were to be found in the sacred text of the Greek Bible, which was the basis of dogma and life; translations were for the common folk. We meet then with this double phenomenon: often great literalness, along with great freedom.

⁶ For this antique characteristic of the Eth. in the Old Testament see Ropes' summary, p. cxlvi seq.; to which add Dillmann's encomium (in his Eth. Bible, 1, 16) of its *simplicitas* and *perspicuitas*. For a recent intensive study see Gehman, 'Old Eth. Version of I. Kings,' *JBL* 1931, 81-114, coming to like result for that book. However conditions vary in different books. In the amplest critical study yet made of an O. T. book, Löfgren, *Die äthiopische Übersetzung des Propheten Daniel*, Paris, 1927, that scholar, p. xlix, comes to the result that for Dan. the oldest form of text exhibits no near relationship with the three great Greek majuscules, and denies the opinion that has been held that Eth. shows close affinity to cod. Alex. In the most recent study of this kind, Mercer, *The Eth. Text of the Book of Eccles.*, London, 1931, the author cites for the Greek only "LXX" and so throws no light on the relations of the text with the Greek witnesses; see review by Gehman, *JAOS* 1932, 260-263. There may be also noted here the essay by S. Reckendorf, 'Ueber den Werth der altäth. Pentateuchübersetzung für die Reconstruction der Septuaginta,' *ZAW* 1887, 61-90, which comes to rather indefinite results. His principal deduction reads to this effect: "Das hier zusammengestellte Material beweist, dass gerade die auffallendsten Abweichungen des äthiopischen Textes von dem recipirten Septuagintatexte nicht auf die Nachlässigkeit der äthiopischen Abschreiber, sondern auf die von den Uebersetzern (beziehungsweise Umarbeitern) benutzte Vorlage zurückzuführen sind." But this critical position cannot at all be maintained for Eth. Acts.

The simpler New Testament texts should have offered a rather easy field for the Ethiopic; but, as Hackspill has shown for a portion of the Gospel of Matthew,⁷ the translator there exhibits the characteristic freedom of his school. Hackspill remarks on 'the actually targumic flavor' of the Gospel translation, this 'in order to obtain greater clarity.' Now this native latitude in translation is given far freer rein in a book like Acts because its Greek is often very difficult, indeed obscure. This original characteristic of that document is confessed by the subsequent revisions, Western, Antiochian, all of which had the purpose of presenting a simpler diction, one that could be 'understood by the people.' Our translator has followed in the same path, but with far less sense of responsibility to the original. Both the narrative matter of Acts often, and the rhetoric of the speeches always, present great difficulty. In such cases our translator applied the rule of simplification for the sake of clarity. Where the text is not immediately clear even to a good scholar, if there was possibility of ambiguity, he cut the Gordian knot by giving some kind of translation — like a schoolboy in his early days of Greek, and went happily on with his task. This habit appeared peculiarly justified for our difficult book, and the translator made the most of his liberty even where an exact translation was not hard to seek. And the habit became still more ingrained as he went on with his task, until at last he falls hopelessly down in the final chapters of the book with the long rhetorical speeches, and the climax in the story of Paul's voyage to Rome, where he flounders in the depths like Paul's own ship, and must content himself with most absurd paraphrases. Thus our translation, more than that of any other Ethiopic version that has been studied, suffers sorely from all kinds of paraphrase and abbreviation, in which indeed the sense often is replaced by nonsense.

I cite a few typical instances of free variation: i. 9-10 the paraphrase, 'and a cloud lifted him up and he ascended to heaven, and while they were looking towards him he was concealed from their eyes' (also L); ii. 39 *οσοις αν προσκαλησεται*

⁷ Pp. 146 ff.

κύριος θεός ἡμῶν, 'who call on the name of the Lord our God' (such confusion of nom. and acc. is common); ii. 43 *πασιν καθότι ἂν τις χρεῖαν εἶχεν*, 'to the needy and poor' (as it were the quantum of the original is retained; L 'to the needy'); iii. 21 *ἀχρι χρόνων καταστάσεως πάντων*, 'until when all is restored'; v. 23 *κεκλεισμενον ἐν πάσῃ ἀσφαλείᾳ*, represented by three adjectives (again the quantum retained); xii. 1 'in that day Herod the king seized the leaders of the House of God and afflicted them,' which contains the gist of the original; xii. 11 *ὁ πέτρος ἐν ἑαυτῷ γενομενος*, rendered quite idiomatically, 'his heart returned to him'; xvii. 18 *κ. τὴν ἀνάστασιν*, 'who saves the dead,' by paraphrase; xx. 24 a case of elaboration of a single term, *διαμαρτυρασθαι*, 'speak and teach and preach,' probably an expansion of L, 'teach and preach.' Why a simple phrase like *δίδους πασι ζῶην κ. πνοήν*, xvii. 25, is rendered 'he gives to him who asks him (read se'elō for se'eb) the spirit of life' is unaccountable, but our texts teem with such paraphrases. Equivalent religious terms are often substituted, at times after local ecclesiastical idiom, e.g. ii. 42 *κλῶντες ἄρτον*, 'and they were blessing tables,' similarly at vs. 46; viii. 17 the reception of the Holy Spirit is expressed by 'the H. S. descended upon them'; the terms for 'apostles' (*ḥawāreyāt*) and 'disciples' (*'arde'at*) are often exchanged, e.g. ix. 26, xiv. 28, xix. 9. Biblical citations are freely introduced: xii. 24 'says the Scripture' for 'the Lord commanded'; xv. 15 'the Scripture' for 'the word of the prophets.' xvii. 19 *ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀρείου παγῶν* is cleverly evaded with 'to the house of their god' (also L; B, following the lead of the Arabic version, is no more intelligent, 'to the house of their governor who is named Ariopagos').

But some renderings of the original in quite easy passages are beyond all understanding, nor can they be explained by text-corruption, so far as can be seen; e.g. vii. 38 *οὗτος ἐστὶν ὁ γενομενος ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ*, 'this is he who guarded them, their synagogue'; ix. 26 *ἐπειράζε κολλασθαι τοῖς μαθηταῖς*, 'he terrified the apostles, judging them'; *ibid.* *ὅτι ἐστὶν μαθητῆς*, 'that he had returned to the apostles'; x. 16 *τοῦτο δὲ ἐγένετο*, 'and so he said' (so L); xi. 26 *χρηματισαί*, 'and they came' (*wabō'ū*; L 'and they caused to come' *wa'abe'ū*; error for *tabāhalū* 'converse to-

gether'?) ; xvii. 28 *του γαρ και γένος εσμεν*, 'they created him' (so also L, where the Lat. tr. is wrong).

The most marked characteristic of our text of Acts is its brevity. Discounting the omissions that may be laid to the charge of scribal lapses, and allowing the general tendency of Ethiopic translators towards simplification of phrases, even where a literal translation presented no difficulty (e.g. the cases cited for simple Gospel narrative by Hackspill, p. 146), we mark in this translation an overwhelming urge to abbreviation. There is nothing like this in the numerous Old Testament texts that have been published in critical editions for there the translators were handling a Semitized Greek of congenial character. Unfortunately, outside of the Gospel of Matthew, almost no critical work has been done on the Ethiopic New Testament; how far we might find the same characteristic in these books (e.g. in the argumentative portions, Ep. Hebrews, etc.) is as yet unknown.⁸ In Acts the Aethiopian met a particularly difficult Greek, as to diction and often as to subject-matter — a difficulty the early ecclesiastical scholarship felt and which is in part responsible for the more popular Western revision, which in its turn affected the Antiochian (cf. Ropes, *Text of Acts*, ccxxxi seq.). The long orations of classical style were quite beyond the parsing of the Ethiopian, while the subject-

⁸ Subsequent to Dillmann's critical edition of the Ethiopic Old Testament, 1853-71 (covering only the historical books), and his text of Joel (in Merx, *Die Prophetie des Joel*, 1879), may be noted Cornill's study of the Eth. of Ezekiel in his *Ezechiel*, 1886, pp. 36-48; F. O. Kramer, *Die äth. Übersetzung des Zacharias*, 1898; N. Roupp, 'Die älteste äth. Handschrift der vier Bücher der Könige, ZA 1902, 296-343 (with critical study of text of Samuel); J. Bachmann, *Obadiah*, 1892; J. Schäfers, *Über die äth. Übersetzung d. Proph. Jeremias*, 1912; O. Löfgren, in addition to his text of Dan. already cited, *Nahum, Hab., Hag., Sach. u. Mal., aethiopisch*, 1930; and the studies by Reckendorf, Gehman and Mercer on the texts of the Pent., 1 Kings and Eccles. noted above. Also the texts of Job, Esther, Amos, Ezra-Neh. have been published by M. E. Pereira in *Patrologia Orientalis*, 1907 et seq. J. O. Boyd is re-editing the Octateuch, of which Genesis (1909), Exodus and Leviticus (1911) have appeared, in Littmann's *Bibliotheca Abessinica*, vols. 3, 4.

Over against this large interest in the Eth. text of the Old Testament, the scholarship of the New Testament is indeed lacking in that field. Subsequent to the immediate interest provoked by the appearance of the first Eth. print of the New Testament (to be treated below), there are to be named several volumes of Bode in the middle of the 18th century (to be noticed below), while for recent years the only substantial critical treatment to be recorded is that by Hackspill for Matt. i-x published 1896.

matter of sections like chap. xix, the scenes at Ephesus, and especially the sea-voyage, chap. xxvii, defied his vocabulary. He appears to have worked singlehanded at his task, took no recourse to other Oriental versions, Coptic, Syriac, which lay within his reach, and which could often have helped him out of his difficulties. If he failed, he was yet a brave man. But withal he had slight literary merits; the Ethiopic, through its particles, its verb syntax, its noun formations, is exceptionally adapted to translating Greek, for the translator who knows both languages.⁹ Our scribe could not use the facilities of his own tongue for the rendering of the Greek.

I note some examples. The following case shows how the translator presents the gist of a difficult passage, while ignoring the unknown words: xix. 35-36 'What man who does not know the greatness of the deity of Ephesus? And now to the deity it is right that we do becomingly and not with tumult and argument' (with ignoring of *νεωκορον* and *διοπετους* as well as of syntax). There is less reason for the rendering of xxiv. 3: *παντη τε και πανταχου αποδεχομεθα μετα πασης ευχαριστιας* as 'and we have found thy law honored by all.' A similar judgment is to be passed upon the illiterate rendering of xxv. 26-27: *διο προηγαγον . . . σημαναι* (where L also runs largely with P, but dropping into obscurity at the end), 'And now behold I have brought him; examine, pray, whether there is what thou wilt find as crime which we can write, since the matter troubles me, and (that) I should send him bound in whom is no evil; and if there is no crime, it will find (?) me.' xxiv. 4-8 is thus summarized, and not badly: 'Hear me, I pray, briefly, while I speak to thee. We found this man a blasphemer and doer of transgression and stirring up all the Jews in all the earth and teaching heresy to the people of the Nazarenes; and he profaned the temple, and we seized him. And all also that we accuse him of thou art fit to know by examination.' The passage xxvii. 12-17 is thus abbreviated: 'And then (+ mankar?) we shall winter. And the most proposed to go forth from there, and if they were able to come to Phoenicia and winter and come to Crete, which is towards the face of the sea of Libā. (13) And

⁹ See Dillmann, *Ethiopic Grammar*, p. 4.

when the south wind blew, we were afraid, and we passed by Crete, (14) and after a time came the north wind, (15) and the ship ran, (16) and we came to an island called Clauda, (17) and we feared that they would not bring us to the sea of Sōryā, and we remained'; and verses 19–20: 'and on the third day, when it was still bad, and it continued for long raining, a day (?) that we did not see light nor star, and we all despaired to live.' The most abbreviated passage is xxviii. 11–14: 'And we sailed in the sea (baḥra, error for ḥamara 'ship') of Alexandria, which wintered in the island, and then we came to Rome.' This abbreviation looks like a final sigh of relief after a long and tedious spell; but possibly it is a case of haplography between *eis Πηγειον* and *eis Ρωμην*. Is the rendering of *μηνυθεισης δε μοι επιβουλης εις τον ανδρα εσεσθαι εξαντης*, xxiii. 30, with the summary 'on account of this' (also L), a case of taedium or of crass ignorance?

I proceed now to present a gleanings of the variations of Eth. as exhibited in P (with occasional reference to L and B) in comparison with the Greek of codex B and other ancient authorities, the comparative material being all drawn from Dr. Ropes' admirably chosen selection of readings accompanying his text of Vaticanus. In this task I have not only made the textual comparison through the course of my study of Eth. but also have further checked my results by careful attention to Ropes' notes on significant variations, and also by examining Eth. from the variations recorded for the Peshitto and the Sahidic in the same volume (pp. 291–356). In this combination of method I trust I have not overlooked any points of moment. But it cannot be too strongly urged that P as a textual witness is sorely handicapped. As has been proved above, our one manuscript is in wretched condition, *per se* and in its lineage. The translator was ill educated in Greek, and produced happy-go-lucky renderings and sheer conjectural summaries in avoidance of difficulties; and this deficiency was embarrassed by the essential idiomatic difficulty of the Greek of Acts. Finally there was the targumic freedom which the Ethiopic translators allowed themselves, and which our translator fully used and abused, as has been demonstrated by examples cited at length.

Accordingly in long passages, almost whole chapters, no items of textual interest can be diagnosed with certainty. But it is hoped that the following display will give on the whole a faithful picture of the textual character and relationships of Eth. I have also noted some cases of similarity with the exegesis of Peshitto and Sahidic.

For sigilla I use **P** and **S** for Peshitto and Sahidic respectively, otherwise the symbols and abbreviations in Dr. Ropes' apparatus: **Unc** = his 'Old Uncial'; **Ant** his 'Antiochian'; **West** = the readings he assembles along with Codex Bezae on his right-hand page, these at times more particularly specified, e.g. **W^D** the Greek of that codex, **W^d** the Latin of the same. The dagger † indicates citation of all his witnesses, with exception of Vulgate (**V**) and Bohairic, the latter offering nothing of value in our comparison.

- i. 4 συναλιζομενος: 'eating with them' = **P S**
- 13 'Bartholomew and Matthew': 'M. and B.' = **P**
- 23 'Barsabbas': 'Barnabas' = **West**
- 26 'eleven [apostles]': 'twelve' = **West**; and ii. 14
'10' for '11' = **West**
- ii. 42 τη κοινωνια κ. τ. λ.: 'together [they were blessing
the table],' exegesis as in **P S** (see Ropes' note)
- 44 παντες δε οι πιστευσαντες επι το αυτο: construed as
predicate sentence + 'and' = **West Unc Ant P S**
- iii. 3 λαβειν: 'that they should give him' = **P S**
- 4 πετρος . . . συν τω ιωαννη: 'P. and J.' = **P** (by
Semitic idiom)
- 6 'silver and gold': 'gold and silver' = **P** (involun-
tary change)
- 6 + 'arise and [walk],' vs. **BND S**
- 7 παραχρημα: + 'and he rose up' (= **LB**) = **W^D**
παραχρημα εσταθη
- 8 'entered the temple and praised the Lord' (= **LB**)
= **West** with omission of περιπατων και αλλομενος
- 22 ειπεν: + 'to our fathers' (= **LB**) = **West Ant S**
- 25 υμων: ημων = **West Unc Ant P S**
- 26 πονηριων: + 'your' = **West Unc Ant P**

- iv. 1 αυτοις: om. (= B) = West
 1 στρατηγος: as pl. (= LB) = P S
 24 δεσποτα συ: 'thou Lord God'; cf. Ant P S + 'God'
 25 ο [του πατρος]: as ος (zalalikā) = West P S
 25 δια πνευματος αγιου στοματος: 'by the H. S., by the mouth of' = West P S (some such paraphrase requisite)
 27 - λαοις: as sing. with some West. rdgs, P S (s. Ropes)
 v. 2 ειπεν: + 'to him' = P
 4 το πραγμα τουτο: + 'to do' = West S
 9 πετρος: + 'said,' vs. BNA alone (requisite in Semitic)
 12 'in Solomon's porch': praeterm. 'in the temple' = West S
 28 λεγων: + 'not' = West P S
 29 ειπαν: + 'to them' = West P S
 31 αφεσιν αμαρτιων: + 'in him' = West S
 32 το πνευμα το αγιον B†: + ὁ
 34 εν [τω συνεδριω]: εκ = West
 36 λεγων ειναι τινα εαυτον: 'and magnified himself' = the plus μεγαν of West Unc P
 37 λαον: + 'much,' vs. BNA†
 40 παρηγγειλαν: + 'them' = W^d S
 40 απελυσαν: + 'them' = West Unc Ant P S
 vi. 1 επισκεψωμεθα B†: επισκεψασθε
 1 πνευματος: + 'holy' = W^d Ant S
 10 πνευματος: + 'holy' = West (Eth. is consistent in this addition)
 vii. 2 ο θεος της δοξης: praeterm. 'God of our fathers,' cf. S + 'of our fathers'
 15 κατεβη: + 'to the land of Egypt,' vs. B† (= Gen. xlv. 6 etc.; on variations in scriptural citations in this chap. s. Ropes at vs. 3)
 15 = ετελευτησεν αυτος, vs. order of B†
 19 πατερας: + 'our' = AC 81 P
 24 sub fin. + 'and buried him in the sand' (Ex. ii. 12) = West
 25 αδελφους: + 'his,' vs. BNC†

- 32 ο· θεος repeated before 'Isaac,' 'Jacob' = West Unc
P S (proper Semitic syntax)
- 34 [στεναγμου] αυτου B West P†: αυτων
- 37 sub fin. + 'hear him' (= LB) = West C P (citing
Dt. xviii. 15)
- 38 εξελεξατο B†: εδεξατο
- 38 υμιν: ημιν = West Unc Ant P
- 42 εστρεψεν: + 'them' = cod. C
τεσσαρακοντα: + 'in the wilderness' = West Unc
P S (citing Am. v. 25)
- 43 θεου: + 'your,' vs. BD P S (citing more fully from
Am.)
- 43 ρομφα: 'Refan' (L 'Rēfām') = P S 'Refan,' West
'Remphan' (s. Ropes)
- 46 οικω BND†: θεω
- 49 οικοδομησατε B P†: οικοδομησετε
- 58 εκβαλλοντες: 'drew him and brought him out'; cf.
P 'seized, cast him out'
- 60 μεγαλη: + 'and said' = West P (by Semitic usage)
- viii. 1 αποστολων: + 'who remained in Jerusalem' =
West S
- 9 εξιστανων: 'led astray,' cf. P (but μαγενων rendered
differently from P)
- 13 εξιστατο: εξισταντο = ACD 81
- 16 του κυριου ιησου: 'Jesus Christ'; cf. West 8 'the
Lord J. C.'
- 18 πνευμα: + 'holy' (= LB) = Unc Ant P
- 24 ειπεν: + 'to them' = West
- 26 αυτη εστιν ερημος: 'desert' = P S
- 33 ταπεινωσει: + 'his' = Unc Ant P S
- ix. 5 ιησους: + 'the Nazarene' = West Unc P
- 21 εν ιερουσαλημ: om. = S
- 26 παραγενομενος: + 'Saul' = Ant
- 31 η μεν ουν εκκλησια καθ ολης ιουδαιας και γαλιλαιας και
σαμαρειας ειχεν ειρηνην: 'and dwelt all the churches
in peace, those in J. and S. and G.'; cf. Western
rdg. noted by Ropes, but P has attached ολης
to εκκλησια

- 40 ηνοιξεν: + 'immediately' = West S
- x. 16 το σκευος: 'all of it' (= B); cf. Western rdgs. noted by Ropes (σκευος is omitted in vs. 11)
- 19 + [πνευμα] αυτου, vs. B West†
- 19 δυο B†: 'three'
- 25 ως δε εγενετο του εισελθειν τον πετρον: 'and Peter coming in' (gerund, wabawihō) = W^D προσεγγιζοντος τ. π., but without the expansion in W^D
- 32 sub fin. + 'and he will speak to thee the word by which thou shalt live'; cf. S 'who coming will speak to thee words by which thou shalt live,' West Unc Ant 'who coming will speak to thee'
- 33 του θεου: σου = West P S
- 36 τον λογον: + 'his,' vs. BNA 81 P (so vs. 37 το ρημα, 'his word')
- 37 κηρυγμα B†: 'baptism' (= LB)
- 41 sub fin. + '40 days' = West S (scriptural reminiscence)
- 46 γλωσσαις: + 'of the lands'; cf. qualifying adjectives in West P S
- 48 επιμειναι: + 'with them' = West P S (but no agreement otherwise with S)
- xi. 3 εισηλθεν, συνεφαγεν B 81†: εισηλθες, συνεφαγες
- 5 τεταρσιν αρχαις: praeterm. 'fastened' = P
- 13 ειποντα: + 'to me' (= L), error for 'to him' (= B; lōtī error for lōtū) = West Ant P S
- 23 προσμενειν εν τω κυριω: 'to turn to the Lord' (= LB), i.e. with omission of εν = West Unc Ant
- 24 sub fin. + τω κυριω, vs. B†
- 25 αναστησαι B†: αναζητησαι
- xii. 5 εκτενωσ: om. = S (P has good paraphrase)
- 5 εκκλησιας: + 'to God' vs. B†
- 7 επεστη: + 'by Peter'; cf. West S + 'by him' (necessary in Semitic idiom)
- 9 ηκολουθει: + 'him' = P S
- 10 την φερουσιν εις την πολιν: om. = cod. L P
- 15 ο αγγελος εστιν αυτου: 'perhaps it is his angel' = P

- xiii. 3 *απελυσαν*: + 'them' = P S (by Semitic idiom)
 6 *βαριησους*: Baryāsūm, cf. W^d Bariesuam
 26 *ημιν*: *υμιν* = Unc Ant P
 38 *δια τουτο* B†: 'on account of him' (ba'enti'ahū) =
δια τουτου
 40 *επελθη*: + 'upon you' = AC 81 Ant P S
 40 *εν τοις προφηταις*: 'of the prophet,' cf. S 'in the
 prophet'
 42 order = *ηξιουν εις το μεταξυ σαββατον*, vs. B†
 xiv. 1 *κατα το αυτο*: 'as always'; cf. S 'according to their
 custom'
 26 + [*κακειθεν*] *απεπλευσαν*, vs. B†
 xv. 4 *μετ αυτων*: + 'with the Gentiles'; cf. S 'in the
 Gentiles' (exegetical)
 16 *κατεστρεμμενα* B^N†: mazbar = *κατεσκαμμενα*
 20 *πνικτων*: 'dead' = S
 20, 29 + the Golden Rule ('and what they wish not for
 themselves not to do to others') = West S (s.
 Ropes)
 23 The plus introducing the epistle found in cod. C S,
 cf. West; P is represented in P by 'enta tebel,
 'which said,' evidently abbreviation of full
 phrase in B mal'ekt ('epistle') 'enta tebel.
 29 *και πνικτων*: om. = West (s. Ropes' note; L inserts
 after 'fornication')
 34 The vs. om. by B^{SA} 81 appears here, but without
 the further plus of West, 'and only Judas went'
 xvii. 19 *δυναμεθα*: 'we desire' = S
 28 *ποιητων*: ignored, and the sentence paraphrased,
 'there were of your midst who said' (= L) =
 West
 xviii. 2 *προσηλθεν αυτοις*: 'they came to him' = West (en-
 tailing in vs. 3 the unique 'they dwelt with
 him')
 7 *τιτιου*: om. = W^B Unc Ant (s. Ropes; P S om.
 'Justus')
 xix. 16 *αμφοτερων*: ignored = Ant
 21 *διελθων*: *διελθειν* = A West S

- 24 ὀνάους: + '[images of] silver' vs. B†
 26 χειρων: + 'of men' = P
 34 μεγαλη η αρτεμις εφεσιων 2° B†: om.
 xx. 4 πυρρου: om. (= LB) = Ant P
 12 ηγαγον: 'he brought' = W^B
 15 εσπερα B†: ετερα
 25 βασιλειαν: + 'of God' = Ant; cf. West S + 'of Jesus'
 35 μακαριον . . . λαμβανειν: 'happier is he who gives than he who receives' = P, cf. W^D (text = μακαριος)
 xxi. 11 Order 'hands and feet' = A S (but natural order)
 xxii. 3 γαμαλιηλου Bal: Gāmāleyāl = γαμαλιηλ with most
 xxii. 15 Position of εση = NA vs. B
 25 εξεστιν: εστιν (yeḫawem) = N
 xxiii. 23 εβδομηκοντα: '100' = W^h Lat. mss. S
 28 The plus of NA, κατηγαγον εις το συνεδριον αυτων = P S appears in abbreviated form
 xxiv. 7 omitted vs. West
 14 + πασι [τοις] = NA 81 P S
 xxv. 25 του παυλου B†: om.
 xxvi. 14 + [καταπεσοντων] ημων, vs. B†
 16 + [αναστηθι και] στηθι, vs. B†
 xxvii. 16 Κλαυδα BN^{c†}: Ḳalāwdā = Κλανδα
 xxviii. 1 μελιτηνη B†: μελιτη
 14 = ηλθαμεν εις την ρωμην, order with A 81 P
 15 τα περι ημων: om. = Lat. mss. P

But the presentation of varieties from a standard text gives a false critical impression unless the identities also are exhibited. These identities could not be completely tabulated without presenting the whole text of P, which does not lie within my purpose. In general it may be understood that without further remark no significant divergences have been overlooked. But in way of partial complement I present the following cases of agreement with cod. B and its congeners, which may be considered as typical in the valuation of the text.

- ii. 43 With BD 81 vs. plus of **NA**C P, cf. S
- iii. 13 With B 81 P avoiding triplication of *ο θεος* (although natural to Semitic idiom)
- 22 = *θεος* B†, vs. *θ.ημων*
- 26 Position of *αναστησας* vs. AD 81
- iv. 25 = *του πατρος ημων*, vacat in West, aligned after 'David thy servant,' cf. S 'D. our f., thy s.' = Irenaeus
- 25 = *κενα*, vs. *καινα* **NA**D
- v. 28 = *διδασκειν* **BND**, vs. *λαλειν* A
- 33 = *εβουλοντο* BA, vs. *εβουλευοντο* **ND**
- vii. 18 = *επ αιγυπτον* BA, om. by D 81
- 21 = *εαυτη υιον* ('her son') B†, vs. *εις υιον* (but idiom-atic?)
- 30 = *φλογι πυρος*, order of **BND**, vs. AC
- 37 Lacks plus of CD P, 'hear him'
- x. 24 = *εισηλθεν* BD 81 P S, vs. *εισηλθον*
- 39 = *ημεις* **BNC** 81, vs. *υμεις*
- 48 = *ιησου*, cf. *ιησου χριστου* **BNA**, *ι. χ.* του κυριου D 81
- xi. 8 = *εκ δευτερου φωνη*, order with B†
- xii. 1 = *ηρωδης ο βασιλευς*, order with **BND**
- xiii. 25 = *τι* **BNA** 81 S, vs. *τινα*
- 33 = *ημων* **NA**CD (s. Ropes' note)
- 33 = *δευτερω*, vs. West Ant
- 44 = *θεου* BC P †, vs. *κυριου*, West *παυλου*
- xiv. 8 = *αδυνατος εν λυστροις*, order with **BN**
- 10 Minus plus of CD P S, 'I say to thee in the name of the Lord'
- 18 Minus plus of C 81, *αλλα πορευεσθαι εκαστον εις τα ιδια*
- 19 Minus long plus of C 81
- 24 'their word' = *τον λογον* BD, minus plus του κυριου
- 26 = B†, minus plus [*κακειθεν*] *απεπλευσαν*
- xv. 24 Minus plus *εξελθοντες* West Ant S (but *εξ ημων* also om.)
- xvi. 7 = *ιησου* **BNAD** P, vs. *κυριου* C
- 11 = *νεαν πολιν* (*hagar ḥadīs*) **BNA**, vs. *νεαπολιν*

- xviii. 3 = *ηργαζοντο* B^N† (also reading preceding verb as pl.), vs. *ηργαζετο*
- xx. 1 = *μεταπεμψαμενος* (understood as *πεμψας*) B^N S†, vs. *προσκαλεσαμενος*
- 21 = *ιησουν* B S†, al. + *χριστον*
- xxi. 16 'Menāsōn' = *μνασωνι* BAC, al. *ιασωνι*, *νασωνι*
- 22 The vs. in disorder but agreeing with BC P S vs. the plus *δει πληθος συνελθειν*
- 25 = B^NA P S vs. plus *μηδεν τοιουτο τηρειν αυτοις ει μη*
- xx. 11 = *ουδεν* [*εβλεπον*] ('albō zara'ikū) B†, vs. *ουκ*
- xxvii. 8 'Laseya' = *λασεα* B 81, vs. *NA*
- 37 '76 = B S†, vs. '276'

There are many cases of apparent agreement or disagreement with the Greek codices which must be discounted because of the translator's idiom. For instance in vii. 51 the genitive [*απεριτμητοι*] *καρδιας* of B† is repeated in P, but by natural Semitic idiom (hence B's reading is not to be too easily ignored, with Ropes). On the other hand the independent nominativus loquentis, occurring e.g. in B at v. 9, xxv. 22, demands in the Semitic the verbum loquendi (so C 81 *εφη*), and this appears in the Eth. as in the other Oriental versions. The variation in the use of pronouns, especially the addition of the dative after verbs of saying, e.g. x. 19 vs. B, is natural to Eth. idiom, in which 'he said to him — to them' is expressed by one vocable, *yebēlō*, *-ōmū*, with which usage the other Oriental versions generally agree. I have not cited above the variations in the names of the Deity and of Christ; e.g. in iii. 20 the order *ιησουν χριστον* appears in P along with AC 81 vs. *χ. ι.* with B^ND; the translators generally allowed themselves wide latitude in the divine nomenclature. Perhaps notable is the faithful preservation of 'Jesus' in three passages in the last list in agreement with B as against younger ecclesiastical use.

In the consideration of the tables this further remark may be made. The influence of the Oriental versions, P and S, is almost nil, despite natural expectations. It is now generally accepted that Christianity was introduced into Abyssinia by Syrian

Christians *via* South Arabia.¹⁰ And ultimately the ecclesiastical connection with the Coptic Church was most close. But in the above comparisons we discover almost nothing that goes beyond the range of idiomatic similarity or the translator's reminiscence of familiar interpretations (a factor not to be ignored in text-comparisons — thus Cod. Alex. in the Old Testament contains reminiscences from the text of the New). For readings shared in by Eth. with P and S, one or both, I may note the pl. *στρατηγοι* iv. 1; the plus 'of our fathers' vii. 2; vii. 58 a doublet phrase; omission of 'in Jerusalem' ix. 21. In the way of reminiscence or parallel interpretation may be observed: iii. 3 the interchange of verbs, 'give' for 'receive'; vii. 31 'said to him God' for *εγενετο φωνη κυριου*; xv. 20 'strangled' is translated with 'dead,' and xvii. 19 *δυναμεθα* with 'we desire.' In xx. 35 the no doubt current phrase, 'more blessed is he who gives than he who receives' is found only in P and Const. Apos. (see Ropes).

But further the lack of optical dependence upon those Oriental versions appears in the almost total absence of the many peculiar readings and particularly pluses which characterize them; and still more from the evident lack of any such resources at the hand of the compiler. If he possessed them, he would never have made such a sorry job of his translation from the Greek, for P and S are excellent and for the most part exact translations. We are accordingly referred solely to Greek sources for the origin of his text.

The Greek exemplar which our translator used contained a text which approached the Antiochian form but which had by no means attained the final polish of the latter. In general, as the first of the two tables above shows, almost all of the Western readings exhibited in P are at home also in the Oriental versions, and our text must have been a fair example of the Oriental *textus receptus* of the day. There are a few cases where

¹⁰ For a summary of older literature see Hackspill, *ZA* 1896, 117 ff.; n.b. especially Guidi, *Le traduzioni degli evangelii in arabo e in etiopico*, Rome, 1888. For more recent discussions see Gregory, *Textkritik*, 2, 553 ff.; Littmann, *Gesch. d. christl. Litteraturen des Orients*, ed. Brockelmann, 1907, 223 ff.; Prätorius in *RE*³ 'Äth. Bibelübersetzungen'; Rossini, *Storia d'Etiopia*, 1928, 1, c. 6.

Western readings appear without support of P and S. I note 'Barsabbas' for 'Barnabas' i. 23; '12 (apostles)' for '11' i. 26, and '10' for '11' ii. 14; the doublet in iii. 7; *εκ* for *εν* v. 54; a parallelism in syntax x. 25, but without the accompanying Western expansion; omission of *πνικτων* xv. 29; ignoring of *ποιητων* xvii. 28; *ηγαγεν* for *ηγαγον* xx. 12. I.e. the text had some features not known to or copied by our P and S. Some examples of a text peculiar to Western and the Oriental versions may be noted: v. 4 + 'to do'; v. 12 + 'in the temple'; v. 31 + 'in him'; vii. 43 'Refan' = P S, West 'Remphan'; viii. 1 + '[apostles] who remained in Jerusalem'; ix. 40 + 'immediately'; xxiii. 23 '100' for '70'; xxviii. 15 omission of *τα περι ημων*. And finally there is the plus of the Golden Rule in xv. 20, 29, found also in S. This is the only one of the significant readings of the Western text in our version.

On the other hand the text has not altogether cast loose from older moorings. The second table shows a fair number of coincidences with B and other early texts against later forms. On the one hand there is no support for the evident errors of Cod. Vat. (the variations from which are listed in the first table); but on the other hand there are some cases where Eth. agrees with it uniquely. I cite vii. 21 *εαυτη υιον*; xi. 8 the order of B; xiv. 26 omission of *κακειθεν*; xxii. 11 *ουδεν*, and in association with S xx. 21 *ιησουν*; xxvii. 37 '76' vs. '276.' To be sure we must be cautious about the significance of the agreements even as about the disagreements. Further, in a text disfigured by the corruption of proper names may be noted the excellent spellings 'Mnason' xxi. 16, 'Laseya' xxvii. 8. It may also be remarked here that in xiii. 1 *μαναν* is given a correct Semitic form, Manāhē (which is not derived from P).

The result reached above for Acts corresponds in general with the judgment of previous students of the Eth. of the New Testament. So Westcott and Hort in their Introduction, New York, 1882, p. 158: "Whatever may be the real origin of the Aethiopic, it is on the one hand strongly Syrian, on the other in strong affinity with its Egyptian neighbors, and especially its nearer neighbor the Thebaic [Sahidic]: both ancient Western and ancient non-Western readings, Alexandrian and other, are con-

spicuous in its unsettled but certainly composite text." Similarly Hackspill, p. 126: the Greek text on which the Eth. Gospels are based "is not the Alexandrian but of Syro-Occidental character"; and so Rossini, *Istoria*, 156: a text 'diffusa in chiesa siro-occidentale.' Our text adds little to the knowledge of this family, but proves that the Abyssinian Church possessed a text of fairly ancient form; despite the probable Syrian origin of that Church, the text is a translation from the Greek with no evident help from the Oriental versions beyond that of reminiscence, this appearing particularly in exegesis; and it is uncontaminated by the revisions which were the subsequent fate of the Ethiopic Bible.

However, the above results are expressed with all modesty by one who was invited by his friend to stray into a field where he is but a wanderer.

Students of Ethiopic literature still dispute over the age of the translation of the Scriptures into that language. Even if our text exhibits some early characteristics, that would not prove much; the translator may have used an old-time authoritative text. Our present text gives one restrictive datum bearing upon its age; in vii. 4 it translates 'land of the Chaldaeans' with 'Persia' (LB 'Chaldaea'), i.e. it must have been composed before the Islamic conquest.

I add a few lexical notes. In v. 34 P translates οἰκῶν with wayn (lit. 'vineyard'), L with 'aşada wayn ('a farm of a vineyard'), B with 'aşad alone; and these two latter have the same renderings for χωριον in i. 18; in v. i κτημα αυτων = PL waynōmū, B 'aşadōmū. It appears then that wayn had a more extended sense in the early language, which later revisions made more specific. In xxviii. 3 εχιδνα = P kăgset, replaced, as though archaic, by L with the more general term for 'snake' 'arwē medr; by B with 'af'ōt, taken direct from the Arabic version, 'af'ā. In xix. 28, 34 PLB agree in translating 'great is Diana goddess of the Ephesians' with 'sanbata (P sanbōta) 'abīya, 'a great festival to Diana.' Does this represent some idiomatic use of sanbat as a ritual expression?

II. THE FIRST ETHIOPIC PRINT OF ACTS, AND THE TEXT OF THE LONDON POLYGLOT (L)

In 1548-49 appeared in Rome the first print of the Ethiopic New Testament, in two quarto volumes published in the consecutive years, the first containing, and in this order, the Gospels, Apocalypse, Catholic Epistles, Hebrews, Acts, the Anaphora of Our Lord and that of Our Lady Mary,¹¹ the second, consecutively paginated with the first, the Pauline Epistles. A copy of the first volume is in the New York Public Library, and a full bibliographical description of it is given in Dr. George F. Black's admirable *Ethiopica and Amharica, A List of Works in the N. Y. Public Library*, 1928, p. 45.¹² The Latin title of the first volume reads as follows: *Testamentum Novum cum Epistola Pauli ad Hebraeos tantum, cum concordantiis Evangelistarum Eusebii et numeratione omnium verborum eorundem. Missale cum benedictione incensi cerae et c. Alphabetum [sic] in lingua . . . gheez, id est libera quia a nulla alia originem duxit, et vulgo dicitur Chaldaea. Quae omnia Fr. Petrus Ethiops auxilio piorum sedente Paulo III Pont. Max. et Claudio illius regni Imperatore imprimi curavit. Anno Salutis MDXLVIII.*

This work was edited by three Abyssinian monks who had fled their country in the fearful Muslim devastations then raging, bringing with them sacred manuscripts: *Tasfā-Şeyōn* ('Hope-of-Sion'), *Tanse'a-Wald* ('Resurrection-of-the-Son'), *Za-Şelāsē* ('He-of-the-Trinity'), monks of the learned convent of *Dabra Libānōs* ('Mount Lebanon' — in Ethiopia, not the

¹¹ For the Ethiopic Liturgy, see Prof. S. A. B. Mercer's book with that title, Milwaukee and London, 1915.

¹² That Library contains the largest collection of Ethiopica in this country, and Dr. Black's Catalogue is a mine of bibliographical information. I acknowledge the particular courtesy of Dr. Joshua Bloch, chief of the Jewish Division of the Library, in affording me the facility of using this rare volume and other books which I could not find elsewhere.

A comprehensive bibliography of Ethiopic Bible prints is to be found in the Historical Catalogue of the Printed Editions in the Library of the British and Foreign Bible Society, by T. H. Darlow and H. T. Moule, 4 pts. (2 vols.), 1903 seq. See also the Appendix on Literature in *Prätorius, Grammatica aethiopica*.

Syrian Lebanon, as has been alleged, so apparently by Gregory, p. 557).¹³ The first of these men assumed the name Peter with the cognomen Aethiops, and was the evident leader of the three, with his name alone given in the title. With him were associated certain Italian scholars, Peter Paul Gualter of Arezzo (who appears in the colophon to Luke as Paul Salsai Farnesios), Bernardin (these two being named in the colophons), and Mariano Vittorio of Rieti, the last the author of the first Ethiopic grammar.¹⁴ The colophons to the Gospels and Acts as well as the Ethiopic title lament the difficulties of the enterprise for men ignorant of the press as well as of letters, and constantly crave the indulgence of the readers.

This Ethiopic text of the New Testament was republished by Brian Walton in the London Polyglot, the New Testament volume in 1657, and it is this form of the Ethiopic Testament that is generally known to scholars. The text was accompanied with a Latin translation, the first for that part of the Bible.¹⁵ Walton had as editors of this text Dudley Loftus of Dublin (1619–1695) and the distinguished Orientalist Edmund Castell, the latter revising the former's work and seeing it through the press.¹⁶ But the new print was a degradation of the first one, and its Latin translation has been excoriated by scholars since Ludolf.

¹³ For notices of this famous convent and its library see Budge, *A History of Ethiopia*, 283, 560, etc.

¹⁴ For the above facts see Ludolf, *Historia aethiopica*, lib. iii, ch. iv, §§ 7–14; his *Commentarius* attached to the same work, p. 297; his *Lexicon aethiopico-latinum*, the *Corollarium* in the preface, fol. 8a; I. Guidi, *La prima stampa del Nuovo Testamento in etiopico, fatta in Roma nel 1548–1549* (in *Archivio della R. Società Romana di Storia Patria*, ix, 1886, 274–278), containing some hitherto unpublished correspondence of the editors and other fresh data; Prätorius, *RE*³ 3, 87; Gregory, *Textkritik*, 2, 557. Mariano Vittorio's grammar bears the title *Chaldaeae seu aethiopicae linguae institutiones*, of date Rome 1552; a copy of the reprint made in 1630 is in the New York Public Library.

¹⁵ Walton also published in the Polyglot the Ethiopic text of Psalms and Canticles for which he gives acknowledgment to the works of Potkin the first editor of Ethiopic prints (*Canticles*, Rome, 1513; *Psalter*, Cologne, 1518; see Prätorius, *Gramm. aeth.*, App. p. 24), and to Pococke for a correct manuscript of the *Psalter*; see his *Biblicus Apparatus*, 416a. The Appendix to the Polyglot, vol. 6, contains 'Variæ lectiones' and 'Annotationes' on these Ethiopic texts by Castell.

¹⁶ Preface to the Polyglot, p. 10.

The appearance of the Ethiopic text under Papal auspices evoked severe criticism from Protestant quarters. Walton met at length (*Apparatus*, 416 ff.) the skeptical arguments of the great Scaliger (the citation is given by Ludolf in his *Commentarius*, p. 297) and the Biblical commentator de Dieu (citing his Appendix to the Gospel of Matthew), who held that the Ethiopic was manifestly a translation from the Vulgate; Walton shrewdly argued that this text agrees no more with the Latin than with the Syriac or other versions, and that there is no reason to suspect the honesty of the translators, whose confession of ignorance is so often made in the colophons to the several books. With still more expert learning Ludolf defended the authenticity of the text in his *Historia*, lib. iii, ch. iv. He recognized the condition of the text in the following terms: "Romana editio ex lacero et mutilo exemplari facta est, cujus lacunae Tesfa-Tzejonus ex Graecis et Latinis exemplaribus explere coactus fuit."

For Acts the editors of the Roman edition in particular exposed themselves to this animadversion in their colophon to the book, which in addition to the abundant traces of Vulgate influence in the text, as we shall observe, naturally gave rise to the notion that the whole was a translation from the Latin. This colophon to Acts is only partly given in the *Polyglot*, and at that with an incorrect translation; Walton attempts a full translation in his *Apparatus*, which again is incorrect. Ludolf, blaming Walton for his mistranslation, first renders it aright. It reads: "This (book of the) Acts of the Apostles *for the greatest part* ¹⁷ has been translated from the Roman and Greek into Ethiopic by reason of the defect of the archetype; for what we have added or omitted, pardon us, do you emend it." So far as their Greek knowledge went, this must have been a vain boast as Ludolf recognizes. It was an equal extravagance to claim translation from the Vulgate 'for the most part,' as the constant agreements with our ancient text P proves. As will be shown, the editors possessed a text doubtless of the same basis as P, one which may have matched it in scribal errors, and comparison with any good version would have shown up its

¹⁷ zayebazeḥ; for the idiom cf. Dillmann, *Lex.*, 532.

glaring faults. They accordingly revised the text from the Vulgate with the help of the good Latinists who were their friends, but this only sporadically. We may visualize their companions helping them out here and there when there was question. Where there appeared lacunae in the exemplar, even as we find such *in extenso* in P, these were filled up from the Vulgate. Gregory states, *Textkritik*, 2, 557, that two extensive lacunae were so complemented: Acts ix. 29-x. 32; xxvi. 8-xxviii. I cannot discover on what authority he makes this statement; there are readings in those sections which do not correspond with the Vulgate. The printing of the text had naturally propaganda as its chief aim, as the inclusion of the liturgical offices indicates, just as has been the case with the great Protestant translations or those of modern Bible Societies, and the correctness of the primitive text was subordinate. Indeed it was simpler to reproduce the original text, where it existed and when it could pass muster, and the Latin was only resorted to when improvement seemed absolutely necessary, for the conversion of Latin into Ethiopic must have been a difficult task for those early scholars. As we have already seen from the agreements of P and L, and as I shall observe below in more particular notes on L, we possess in the latter a text which is basically of the same family as P; often it preserves a correct reading as over against the latter; on the other hand it exhibits its own vagaries, doublets, omissions, lexical and syntactical changes, similar to those found in P. It would be bootless to push the examination of the relation of L to the Vulgate to extremes; indeed variations of L from P are only of critical interest when they do not run with the Vulgate. In one sense L is primitive; its text has not been subjected to Arabizing revision, and so it stands in close relation to P, the only known manuscript which is free of that influence.¹⁸ It is to be understood that in the following

¹⁸ One scholar alone has devoted himself to the translation and critical study of this printed text of the New Testament, C. A. Bode, in the middle of the 18th century (for bibliography see Prätorius, *op. cit.* 25); his work includes a Latin translation of the Ethiopic New Testament from the Polyglot text, 1752, 1755; a critical study of the same in comparison with the Greek, 1753; also a critical and philological study on the Ethiopic Gospel of Matthew, 1749 — a copy of which is in the Andover-Harvard Library. I regret I have not access to this scholar's critical study of Acts.

study I cite from the Polyglot text, which without doubt is a copy of the Roman print, barring editorial and typographical errors.

To enter into detail for L, I note first some of the patent Latinisms which appear in that text and which may serve as curiosities. xiii. 1 to 'Niger' is added the gloss, 'which by its interpretation is *black*.' xiv. 12 to 'they called Barnabas Zeus and Paul Hermes' is added, 'since he is called Jove (Yob), is called Mercury in the city of Rome.' xvi. 11 *νεαν πολιν* is Italianized with the gloss, 'whose name is Nāpūlē.' xix. 24 'Artemis' has the gloss, 'who is named Diana.' xix. 34 *του διοπετους* is translated 'this molten-image which was sent from Jove (Yob).' xxvii. 1 *σεβαστης* is translated 'of Augustus.' xxvii. 17 'the Syrtis' is amplified, 'a sand whose name is Sart in the Roman language.' xxviii. 13 *ρηγειον* is transliterated Rēzīyūm with the case-ending of the Latin and the softening of the *g* after Italian fashion. At xxvii. 21 the unique *lucris* of Vulg. is rendered (rabāḥ).

Where L differs from P and B and agrees with V we may generally assume influence from the latter. The following cases are samples. vii. 52 *προδοται και φονεις* is translated with two nouns, with V, where PB have verbal paraphrases. vii. 33, where PB have 'the law and statutes of angels,' L with choice of fresh nouns has 'the law in ordinances of angels' with V. viii. 4 *λογω*: + 'of God' = V. viii. 9 *προυπηρχεν*: 'dwelt formerly' with V, vs. PB which ignore the meaning of the verb. viii. 18 *χρηματα*: 'money,' V 'pecuniam' (PB 'vessels'). ix. 26 *επειραζε κολλασθαι τοις μαθηταις* is correctly translated, vs. a total breakdown of P. ix. 6 sub fin. 'and he will tell thee what there is for thee to do' = V. x. 9 'at the sixth hour' is literally translated with V vs. PB 'at noon.' x. 13 *εγενετο φωνη*: 'came a voice' V *facta est vox*, vs. PB, 'and there spoke to him and said to him.' x. 22 *μαρτυρουμενος* is literally translated, with V, vs. PB, 'all the Jews *knew* him.' xvi. 13 *ου ενομιζομεν προσευχην ειναι*: 'since it appeared to us a prayer (-place) was there,' V *ubi videbatur oratio* (PB 'since a church of the Christians was there').

These may suffice as current examples. There are many passages, sometimes whole verses which are conformed, vs. PB,

to the Greek, in which doubtless the translator has made use of the Vulgate. Ch. xxvii, sadly mutilated and abbreviated by P, may be taken as a case in point. Vs. 5 L = V in order of words as also with 'Lystra' vs. 'Myrra' of Gr. Vs. 7 κρητην κατα σαλμωνην: L 'Crete near S.' = V C. juxta S. Vs. 8 καλους λιμενας: sannaya marsō = V Boniportus. λασεια: Ὑαλεις = V Thalassa. Vs. 9 παρηνει: nazazōmū = V consolabatur (B 'advised,' P om.). Vs. 12 λιβα = V Africam. και κατα χωρον: 'and Ḳōrōn' = V et ad Coron. Vs. 13 αραντες ασσον παρελεγοντο την κρητην: 'being borne from Asson they faced Crete' = V cum sustulerint de Asson legebant Cretam. Vs. 16 f. της σκαφης ην αραντες: 'when we had raised that little ship into the big ship,' cf. V scapham (skiff). Vs. 21 της αστειας υπαρχουσης: 'and there-upon was a great fast and at that time' = V et cum multum jejunium fuisset, tunc. κερδησαι . . . ζημιαν: 'and to make this loss and submersion of profit' = V lucrifacere facere injuriam hanc et jacturam. At the same time Vulgate is not consistently followed. Vs. 14 is reduced to the brief statement, 'and then the north wind blew it.' Vs. 2 οντος συν ημιν is represented with a doublet, 'who continually remained with us, remaining (?) with us,' the first clause representing possibly V perseverante. In xxviii. 11 to διοσκουροις is added the plus, 'who is the god of sailors,' found also in B, hence of native tradition. Vs. 16 L has the plus of Western, also Sahidic, 'the centurion delivered the prisoners to the stratopedarch.' Accordingly L is not based entirely, as has been alleged, for these chapters upon V. It has indeed been suggested that the influence of the Roman Vulgate may have entered Abyssinia with the Portuguese colonists of the 16th century.

However, the relation of L to the Vulgate is notorious; it is more important to discover of what character the underlying text was. As has appeared in our examination of P, L constantly runs with it, even in its grossest errors, which the translators in Rome did not see fit to correct, proof of the sporadic character of that revision. A typical passage is xvii. 18-19, where 'Epicureans and Stoics' is represented in P and L with 'wise men' (so also B, with an added gloss of correct translation); and 'taking him to the Areopagus' is rendered in both 'they led him to the

house of their god,' the same translation appearing again at vs. 22. In the same chapter occurs an interesting case of the survival of the original erroneous translation plus a gloss of one word correcting it, presumably from the Latin: vs. 23 *αγνωστω θεω*: 'purge yourselves (see above for explanation of the rendering) to the *unknown* (L's addition) God.' Other examples of the character of L may be conveniently taken from the same chapter. Vs. 6 *και τινας αδελφους* is omitted. Vs. 7 *απεναντι των δογματων καισαρος πρασσουν* is represented in PLB by varying amplifications: P 'they make defection and legislate (rt. šr') and command ('zz) another law'; L 'they make defection and desire (ftr) another law'; B 'these make defection from Caesar and teach (mhr) another law' — i.e. all minor variations without influence from outside. Vs. 18 *την αναστασιν* is rendered by P and L with 'who saves the dead.' Vs. 21 *αθηναιοι δε παντες κ. οι επιδημουντες* appears in both as 'and the people of Athens and all who travelled here.' Both omit in vs. 24 *ουτος ουρανου κ. γης υπαρχων*, and in vs. 25 *προσδεομενος τινος*. In vs. 25 they agree in rendering *θεραπευεται* with 'is healed,' and in vs. 28 in translating *του γαρ και γενος εσμεν* with 'they created him.' In vs. 31 P's translation 'akdama ('foreordained'; B 'akama = Gr.) for *εστησεν* is corrupted in L to the senseless bakama. Ch. xxiv. 6, vacant in P as in Cod. Vat., is supplied in L but independently of Vulgate. These cases thus exhibit a typical Ethiopic version, one of a group with inner variations, and in none of them do we find the alien influence of the Latin version.

Similar features are found throughout this text. There are various kinds of scribal errors: iv. 4 '500' for '5000'; xi. 4 '17' for '16'; xi. 12 slst for sdst, i.e. '3' for '6'; xiii. 7 'Tariasa' for 'Bariesus'; xv. 34 'Paul' for 'Silas.' Whole verses are missing, e.g. vii. 56 (by homoiotel.), x. 12. The practice of free amplification common in the Ethiopic Bible is fully illustrated; e.g. ix. 24 'they commanded to watch' for 'they watched'; vs. 24 'hearing them they took' for *λαβοντες*; vs. 38 for *μη οκνησης*, 'that he should come there and not delay'; vs. 39 'upper room' + 'where was her corpse'; vs. 43 'tanner' + 'of shoes.' Original doublets appear which are not dependent on Vulgate: ix. 24 *ανελωσιν*, 'seize and kill' (PB 'kill'); vs. 26

ελληνιστας, 'Gentiles and Greeks' (PB 'Greeks'); xi. 1 εκατονταρχης is rendered with 'a captain of a hundred, a command (za'amata?) of royalty'; xviii. 2 ποντικον το γενοσ = 'his city Ponto (= P) and his city 'Antan.'

The above comparison has been made primarily with P. But there are numerous cases of equivalence with B as against P, of which I cite a few: viii. 2 συνεκομισαν, 'carried' vs. P 'buried'; viii. 6 βλεπειν 'see' vs. 'be amazed at'; ix. 21 πορθησας, rt. db' 'waste, vs. ktI 'kill'; xvii. 25-26 τα παντα . . . ανθρωπων,' and he made all together and all people,' quite different from P; xxviii. 11 the plus already noted, το διοσκουροις, 'god of sailors'; and again the apparent Latinizing plus in xvi. 11 το νεαν πολιν, 'whose name is Nāpūlē,' but the same appear in B, and hence they may be old glosses.

Discounting then the obvious and numerous, yet sporadic contaminations of L from the Vulgate, we discover in it a genuine Ethiopic text, which is most closely allied to P *in ipsis-simis verbis*, as also in general character of translation. On the other hand it has its connections with B. Accordingly it is a younger revision of P in the direction of that form of text which B gives, B being dependent upon that intermediate form. At the same time there is no evident Arabism in L, so that it is well prior to the Arabizing B. These three witnesses to the Ethiopic translation of Acts bear witness then to that constant kaleidoscopic variation found everywhere among the texts of the same book, in which almost every scribe felt free to introduce fresh changes, whether on the basis of fresh authorities (Greek, Oriental versions and above all the Arabic, and finally, as we see in one case, the Latin) or after his own wilful impulse. Our study may have reestablished the fundamental authenticity of the much castigated text of L, which in its present form is of small value without an intensive amount of criticism. For a due appreciation of these characteristics of Ethiopic texts the reader may well refer to the sagacious remarks of Guidi in the article already cited (note 10 above) in the essay he gives at the conclusion, pp. 31-37, on translations of the Gospels.

III. THE BRITISH BIBLE SOCIETY PRINT (B)

A history of this text and its reprints is one primarily of bibliographical interest. For full information I refer to the Historical Catalogue of the British and Foreign Bible Society (see note 12 above), 2, 351-359 (listing a rich collection, with the titles carefully digested); Prätorius, *RE*³ 87 ff.; Gregory, *Textkritik*, 2, 557 ff.; Hackspill (in article already cited), *ZA* 1896, 191; R. H. Charles, Hastings' *DB*, 1, 791; G. F. Black's *Ethiopica* and *Amharica* (see note 12 above: the New York Library contains copies of the London and Basel prints). Hackspill, p. 191, n. 3, cites Tregelles in Smith's *DB* on Platt's view of his text.

The B. and F. B. Society print was edited by Thomas Pell Platt: the Gospels in 1826, Acts to Revelation in 1830, the two parts then bound together with Latin title *Novum Testamentum . . . aethiopice*, facing the Ethiopic title. It was printed with types cast from the matrices used by Ludolf and preserved in the Public Library at Frankfurt a. M. According to Gregory, Platt used but one manuscript for Acts, which was in possession of the Society. This text was reprinted under the auspices of the Society and of Krapf, the famous missionary to Abyssinia, at Basel, in two parts, 1874-78 (not noticed by Gregory), with the Ethiopic and Amharic translations facing one another. At least Charles calls it a reprint; Hackspill observes that the two prints "vary little from one another." The same work was published again, "revised by Prätorius" (so *Cat. B. F. B. Soc.*), for the Swedish Mission in Abyssinia, at Leipzig, 1899. The three prints would appear to be practically identical. I have used the London print, for the use of a copy of which I am indebted to the courtesy of the Andover-Harvard Library.

That B has a common substratum with P and L has already been shown in the tables and notes given above. It possesses a critical value in giving a possible control of mutilated readings in those earlier texts. But it belongs to that major class of revised translations of the Ethiopic Bible which was subjected to revision from the Arabic 'vulgate' translation.¹⁹ This Arabiz-

¹⁹ See Hyvernât, 'Arabes (Versions)' in Vigouroux's *DB*.

ing process has been increasingly recognized by critics since Dillmann's day, and it is sufficient here simply to refer to some of the recent learned treatments of the subject.²⁰ The Arabizing strain entered into Abyssinia stoutly at the end of the 14th century, and with its fresh revisions replaced the old native texts of the Bible, the manuscripts of which were largely lost in the murderous wars with the Muslim invaders.

The only Arabic text I have used is that of the London Polyglot, itself copied from the Paris Polyglot. I have made no particular study of this text, as it lacks critical interest for my purpose. Based on incidental notes I have made in the course of this study I will give some evidence for its dependence upon the Arabic quarter. It may be said that B is a far more finished and scholarly text than the others, evincing workmanship after the classical Arabic exemplar.

We find the Arabizing influence in the rendering of proper names: xix. 1 σκευα B 'Askēwā, Arab. 'Askawā; xxi. 3 πτολεμαις (= PL), B 'Akkā = Arab.; xxvii. 2 αδραμυτηνω, B 'Adramītis, Arab. 'Adramīti; vs. 3 σειδωνα, B Saidā = Arab.; vs. 7 κρητην, B 'Akrētēs = Arab. A number of words and phrases in which B depends upon Arab. may be cited: xx. 30 ελυσεν αυτον (so PL), B 'loosed his bonds' = Arab.; xxiii. 23 δεξιολαβους (PL 'lancers'), B 'archers' = Arab.; xxv. 17 εης (PL 'the next day'), B 'in the morning' = Arab.; xxvii. 4 αρτεμωνα (L 'big sail'), B 'little sail' = Arab.; xxvii. 17 συρτιν (L as n. pr.), B 'whirlpool' = Arab. The phrase xxiv. 10 ανεθετο τα κατα τ. παυλον (= PL) is rendered, 'he told them the news about P.' = Arab. At xvii. 18 'Stoics' (ignored by PL) is represented by rawāḳeyāuyān, i.e. from Arab. rawāk, 'stoa,' as in the Arab. tr. (Dillmann, Lex., cites only this one occurrence of the word). At xvii. 19 B translates, 'they led him to the house of the judge who is named Ariospagos'; cf. Arab. ' . . . to the most learned of the wise and to their judge'; similarly at vs. 34 for 'Dionysios the Areopagite' B. has 'D. of the judges of Areopagos,' cf.

²⁰ Dillmann, Lex., Praef. col. v seq.; C. C. Rossini, 'Sulle versioni et sulle revisioni della sacra scrittura in etiopico,' ZA 1895, 236-239; Hackspill, ZA 1896, 159 ff.; Löfgren, Äth. Übersetzungen des Proph. Daniel, p. xlv seq. (with bibliography); also Littmann and Rossini, cited in note 10 above.

Arab. 'a judge of the learned ones.' There is the tendency to replace native words with those of Arabic origin; e.g. P ḡagsat (ἐχιδνα), xxviii. 3, becomes 'af'ōt; at iii. 3 meṣwāt ('alms') replaces 'af'amt. Καισαρ is generally, although not always, transliterated by B with the Arab. as against idiomatic nagāši with PL.

It appears from the above that the revision was done selectively from the Arabic. As the latter belongs to the Antiochian stream of text, the general *textus receptus* of the Church, it would be bootless to pursue this research to a fine point.

In fine, we possess in the three texts studied as many different strata of translation and revision: in P a mutilated form of primitive text; in L one that is still free from Arabism, but which has been revised at a late day from the Latin; and in B an Arabizing text, belonging to the category of most Ethiopic Biblical manuscripts.

NOTES

SUAREZ AND VICO

A NOTE ON THE ORIGIN OF THE VICHIAN FORMULA

Veri criterium est id ipsum fecisse.

This is the pivotal formula, the central theme of the speculative system of G. B. Vico.

When the question of the origin of this axiom, fraught with such important results for the destiny of moral sciences, is investigated in detail, it will be necessary to proceed to a thorough examination of the relations connecting Vico's metaphysics with scholastic thought, and especially with the systematization given to it by F. Suarez.

The origin of the Vichian formula must be looked for in the treatment given by Suarez to the *circumsessio*, the identicalness of divine attributes. In Suarez' exposition, the three *passiones entis* are unity, truth, goodness: *unum, verum, bonum*.

The *unum*, divine indivisibility, appears in the opposition, established by Vico, between divine science, containing all things, indivisible, and human science, divisible, analytic, a mere "anatomy of nature."

The *unum*, divine perfection, is the basis of the Vichian distinction between *intelligere* and *cogitare*: *plasma* and *monogramma*; and the leitmotif of Vico's refutation of Descartes: the *cogito ergo sum* appears to Vico as mere *conscientia*, not *scientia*. The same motif is present in the duality of *mens divina*, which is *compos scientiae*, and *mens humana*, merely *particeps* of it; of *verbum proprium* and *verbum improprium*.

Vico takes over Suarez' exposition of the convertibility of the attributes of the Godhead. *Verum et factum reciprocantur, seu, ut Scholarum vulgus loquitur, convertuntur*.

The multiplicity of the attributes of God, says Suarez, is to be explained by the *processio realis ab intra*. *Verum increatum* converts itself into *verum creatum, verbum reale*. *Verbum* is God's Wisdom. *Verum* is convertible with *factum ad extra*, in the temporal process. The two conversions, *ab intra* and *ad extra*, appear in the definite distinction that Vico draws between *genitum* and *factum* (De Anti-quissima Italarum sapientia, Liber I, II).

The convertibility of *verum* with *bonum* signifies the cognition by mind, of truth, its product, as the result of its activity: *ita verum cum bono convertitur si quod verum cognoscitur, suum esse a mente habeat quoque a qua cognoscitur*. By such a cognition, human mind becomes an imitator of the divine one; because God, by knowing the Truth, begets it eternally *ab intra*, and temporally *ad extra*. *Veri criterium*, says Vico, *quemadmodum apud Deum inter creandum, est suis cogitatis bonitatem communicasse: vidit Deus quod essent bona; ita apud homines sit comparatum, vera quae cognoscimus, effecisse*. (De Antiquissima, I, I.)

Verum ipsum factum is the form assumed in Vico's system by the divine identity of the dyad: *velle posse*. Cusanus has found a still more striking formulation in his definition of God as the *possest*.

Prefigurations of the *verum ipsum factum* may be seen in Suarez' asseveration that "the soul comes to self-cognition only through its activities, in which its essence is revealed," and in his statement that "that nature which is thought by mind in the form of a *universale*, is to be found in things themselves; therefore it must be claimed that the *universale* is, according to its content, *objectively real*."

The originality of Vico consists in his idea of applying the *veri criterium id ipsum fecisse* to the scientific domain (De Antiquissima), and to history (Scienza Nuova).

But we must not forget that the Vichian system plunges deep roots in scholasticism. In the Scienza Nuova they are less visible than in the De Antiquissima. In the closing page of the latter, Vico tells us that his aims are: to construct a metaphysics suitable to human infirmity, neither permitting to man all truths, nor denying them all to him, but tracing definite boundaries to human enquiry. To distinguish divine from human truth, not putting human before divine science (that is why the demonstration, *a priori*, of the existence of God appears to Vico utterly impious, since, having established the convertibility of *verum* with *factum*, and adopted that *veri criterium id ipsum fecisse*, such demonstration would be tantamount to *Dei Deum se facere*), but constituting divine science as a rule (synthesis as against analysis). The Vichian metaphysics should, according to the intention of its author, eliminate both dogmatism and scepticism, and minister to experimental science. But it is characteristic that the formula of the criterion of truth appears to Vico most perfectly operative in mathematics, and in theoretical, rather than experimental, physics. In the De Antiquissima the formula is combined with a far

too ingenious philosophic interpretation of etymologies, in order to substantiate the claim of the existence of ancient Italic wisdom.

"While I was meditating on the origins of the Latin language (*De Antiquissima*, Preface), I noticed that the origins of many words were so learned that they seemed to have sprung up not from the usage of a vulgar people, but from a certain inward wisdom. Nothing prevents a language from being replete with philosophic locutions, if the people using it is devoted to philosophical speculation. I can remember that, at the time when Aristotelian philosophers and Galenic physicians flourished, it was common to hear on the lips of illiterate people such expressions as: 'flight from the void; the hatreds and loves of nature; the four humors and qualities'; and innumerable expressions of this type. Later on, when the new physics and medicine came into vogue, one heard the common people using such expressions as: 'the circulation of the blood; coagulation; useful and harmful ferments; pressure of the atmosphere'; and many others of the same kind. Before the time of the Emperor Hadrian such vocables as '*ens*,' '*essentia*,' '*substantia*,' '*accidens*', were unknown to the Latins because they were not acquainted with the metaphysics of Aristotle; later the scholars studied it assiduously and popularized these terms. Therefore, seeing that the Latin language was full of expressions of a certain learnedness and knowing, by the testimony of history, that the early Romans, up to the time of Pyrrhus, had as their only occupation agriculture and war, I conjectured that they must have received these expressions from another and learned nation and have used them without realizing their full import. I find only two learned nations from which the Latins could have taken them, the Ionic and the Etruscan. There is no need of my expatiating on the scholarliness of the Ionic nation because in it flourished the Italic sect of philosophers, which was very learned and prominent. That the Etruscans were a very civilized nation is attested by their magnificent religious system. Civil theology is cultivated there where natural theology is in honor; and religions are more august where people have worthier ideas of the Godhead. . . . The architecture of the Etruscans, simpler than any other, gives a weighty proof that they outstripped the Greeks in geometry. Etymologies attest that a goodly part of the Ionic language was imported into the Latin. It is certain that the Latins took from the Etruscans their religion and with it their sacred expressions and pontifical words. Therefore I conjectured that Latin words which are outstanding on account of their meaningful subtlety originated with both those nations. Conse-

quently I undertook the task of discovering ancient Italic wisdom from the origins of the Latin language."

Especially cogent proof that the ancient Italic sages were fully aware of the convertibility of truth with fact is seen by Vico in four Latin words: *numen, casus, fatum, fortuna*. *Numen*, because, he says, the Latins *deorum voluntatem dixere numen, quasi Deus Opt. Maximus suam voluntatem facto ipso significet, et tanta celeritate et facilitate significet, quam celer et facilis nutus est oculorum*. Of *fatum* and *casus* he gives the following interpretation: *dictum Latinis idem ac certum: certum idem ac nobis determinatum; fatum autem et dictum idem, et factum et verum cum verbo convertuntur. Et ipsi Latini, cum quid celeriter effectum datum significare volebant, dictum factum dicebant. Ad haec et rerum et verborum exitum "casum" dixerunt. Igitur qui Itali sapientes has voces primi excogitarunt, aeternum caussarum ordinem fatum esse sunt opinati; ita ut facta Dei dicta sunt, et rerum eventa, verborum quae Deus loquitur, casus, et fatum idem ac factum; et ideo fatum putarunt inexorabile, quia facta infecta esse non possunt*. (De Antiquissima, I, VIII.) As for the word *fortuna*, it exemplifies the Latins' awareness of the convertibility of truth with goodness. *Fortuna, sive prospera, sive adversa dicebatur, et tamen fortuna ab antiquo fortus, seu bonus, dicta. . . . An igitur antiqua Italiae philosophia opinata est Deum bonum facere quicquid facit, et omne verum, seu omnem factum idem sit bonum*. (Ibidem, I, VIII.)

In the *Scienza Nuova* the Vichian formula postulates the possibility of a constitution of a philosophy of history based on the analysis of the faculties of human mind (this refers us to the interpretation of the word *facultas* as *faculitas, facilitas*, as *exprompta faciendi solertia*, De Antiquissima, III, VII). But the extent to which Vico is anchored in scholastic thought is revealed by the trouble which he experiences in immanentizing the concept of Providence; the magic formula he had culled from Suarez' exposition of Christian metaphysics and applied to science and history proved to be in the end, despite outstanding services, as much a fetter as a tool.

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